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PHANTOM FREEDOM: OFFICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF
VIOLENCE TO PERSONAL SECURITY AND
SUBVERSION OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
AND AMBITIONS FOLLOWING
EMANCIPATION, 1865-1910*
AREMONA G. BENNETr**
INTRODucrION
In the wake of the Civil War, local law enforcement measures,
legislative enactments, and judicial decisions in the slaveholding states
of the South frustrated the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 and
the Thirteenth Amendment adopted two years later. At the federal
judicial level, a policy of nonintervention against randomized lawless-
ness and its consequences devitalized the Fourteenth Amendment un-
til well into the next century. Indeed, for the last third of the
nineteenth century and beyond, de jure freedom for those newly
emancipated availed them little in many areas. This Article will ex-
amine two: their personal security and their nontestamentary right or
reasonable expectation to own, acquire, or possess property of
whatever kind without fear of loss.
Included in this examination are the eleven southern states,
which formed the Confederacy, as well as Kentucky, which remained
nominally loyal to the Union.1 Equal in significance to military rebel-
lion, however, is the consistency of behavior by all southern states in
the force that they exerted over persons of color following the Civil
* This article is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother, Elizabeth G. Jones.
** Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania; J.D., New York University School of Law; M.A., Fordham University. I would
like to thank Paul Finkelman for his valuable comments and suggestions. My thanks also to
Hope Farrell for her able research assistance. Research for this article was supported by a grant
from the Widener University School of Law.
1. In the nineteenth century, status as a slaveholding state was a major factor in defining
the South. Accordingly, this region comprised the fifteen states of Alabama, Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal
History, 64 N.C. L. REv. 77, 86 & n.57 (1985). Although Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and
Missouri remained loyal to the Union, Kentucky courts were openly hostile to war measures
imposed by the federal government and chafed bitterly under the privations that the war and its
aftermath occasioned. See infra notes 61-69, 99-101 and accompanying text.
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War.2 Deplorable practices or events occurring in one state might just
as easily exist elsewhere in the South. On multiple levels, these states
formed a regional bloc that did not begin to release its hold on the
activities of black lives until the late twentieth century.
While appreciable numbers of white Republicans faced the same
cruelties inflicted on persons of color after the war, the determining
factor in abuse against whites was virtually always political affiliation.
Blacks could, and did, become targets of violence merely because of
their color. In addition, four million freed slaves would force a re-
structuring of a region that staggered the minds of the mainly anti-
republican white South. Countless former slaveowners, their families,
and sympathizers did their mightiest to frustrate the changes brought
by the war and the three constitutional amendments adopted between
1865 and 1868. This Article examines the official devices used and
actions taken to delay the exercise of liberty by persons of African
descent during the years 1865 .to 1910.
Elemental in meaning, personal security reflects an unmaimed,
unassaulted, intact human being. In a more universal vein its
equivalent is life, first among the inalienable rights declared by this
nation's founders to be divinely conferred. After the Civil War, at
least one member of Congress advanced the concept of personal se-
curity as an "absolute right" along with "the right of . . .personal
liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. ' 3
Blanket authority to chastise the millions confined in slavery pre-
sumably ended with its abolition. Only a change in the belief in racial
supremacy by the advocates of slavery, however, could have tempered
the habits of lifetimes. This change did not occur; and the physical
punishment imposed as a right under the old authority underwent an
adaptation in the form of organized abuse meted out by often pro-
tected vigilante groups.
Tied to the unpredictability of one's security were the obstacles to
black social and economic progress that southern white society cre-
ated at the war's end. For the years 1865 and 1866, Black Codes offi-
2. The author understands that the term "person of color" sometimes had particular, not
generic, meaning in the mid-nineteenth century and beyond. For example, in certain southern
states, notably but not exclusively Louisiana, persons of color referred only to persons of mixed
ancestry with European or Caucasian strains as part of the mixture. Other states used it all-
inclusively as long as bloodlines contained some fraction of African ancestry. Throughout this
Article the term will be used interchangeably with person of African descent, black, and, where
quoted, Negro.
3. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
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cially curtailed aspirations by persons of color.4 Thereafter, often
customary barriers weakened efforts to get, keep, or use tangible re-
sources (land, crops, belongings, and trades) included in the concept
of proprietary rights.5 Despite Reconstruction, the continued inequal-
ity of the races compromised advancement of southern blacks as a
whole. The abolition of slavery notwithstanding, white southerners
forced persons of color to submit to externally-imposed constraints for
nearly a century. Conversely, black opposition to unwanted controls
after the war often necessitated flight, if lives were spared at all.
Against these precarious conditions and eclipsing the largely
transitory gains of Reconstruction was the refusal or equivocation of
southern state legislatures and state and federal courts to actualize
measures that would benefit persons of African descent in the South.
I. HiSTORICAL REFERENCE: SLAVE AND FREE PERSONS
OF COLOR IN THE ERA OF SLAVERY
A. Justification for Slavery
Constraints on persons of African descent in the United States
began well before the country's formation. The preservation and per-
petuation of slavery after 1787, however, required an explanation that
could coexist with the ends for which the Revolutionary War had been
fought. Slaveholding states found that explanation in the claim of ra-
cial inferiority of Africans and persons of African descent.6 It was
foreseeable, then, that the ideology of inferiority devised to justify
slavery would not permit a later renunciation of a collective self-im-
age-the superior white race-perfected over preceding generations.
And for the last decade of the eighteenth century, until the Civil War,
survival demanded that "the most efficient coercive mechanism avail-
4. See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
5. Writers have referred to such rights in the abstract, that is, not linked to an era or a
culture. See, e.g., SIR JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 264 (1924) ("The aggregate of a man's
proprietary rights constitutes his estate, his assets, or his property in one of the many senses of
that most equivocal of legal terms."). A more particular, although narrower, construction and
one that is perceptible in the context of slavery parallels certain abolitionists' arguments in favor
of "personal freedom" meaning the "right to testify in courts of law, the right to own, buy, and
sell real estate, the right to sue and be sued." AUGusT MEIER & ELuOTr RUDWICK, FROM
PLANTATION TO GHETTO 148 (rev. ed. 1970).
6. The original justification in African paganism proved irrational with the increase in
slave conversions to Christianity and problematic with the freedom those conversions necessi-
tated. Colonies in the late seventeenth century solved the dilemma by passing laws that denied
freedom despite conversion. Subordinacy of the race evolved as the principle on which the
South upheld slavery. See generally Wilbert E. Moore, Slave Law and the Social Structure, in
THE LAw OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 325 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
able," 7 namely, slavery, overcome any doubts about the ideology's
logic or morality. Judicial decisionmakers confirmed the authority of
legislative enactments in cases like Sterrett's Executor v. Kaster in
which the Alabama Supreme Court repeated a longstanding rule for-
bidding a slave to own property.8
Such decisions and the slave codes on which they were based did
not conflict with the federal Constitution since that document recog-
nized slavery.9 Nonetheless, some abolitionists condemned slavery for
its denial of innate rights, if not constitutional precepts. The issue of
citizenship, for example, although not at the forefront of contention
between abolitionists and defenders of slavery, emerged at the fringe.
The conception of national citizenship and of certain privileges and
immunities attaching to it, though vague, rudimentary, and ill de-
fined, was yet basically present in abolitionist constitutional theory
as early as 1834-1835. Appearing as a part of the undifferentiated
mass of the total religious, ethical, natural rights argument, the ex-
pression 'American citizen'-sometimes 'citizens of the United
States'-was roughly interchanged with 'human beings' or 'persons
having inalienable rights' .... [One such abolitionist,] Elizur Wright
... casually spoke of slaves as citizens. 10
But recognition of natural rights for slaves in the 1830s was contrary
to the institution and its rationalization. The adaptability of slaves to
their lot would be the norm for many more years.
1. The Human Dynamic of Slave and Owner
It would have been impossible to oversee every encounter be-
tween slave and nonslave given the prevalence of persons of color,
most of whom were enslaved, in the South." For this reason customs
and practices evolved to circumvent legal prohibitions, which resulted
in the accumulation of assets that the slave often concealed. What
fostered such habits were the sheer numbers of blacks and, in some
7. JAY R. MANDLE, THE RooTS OF BLACK POVERTY: THE SOUTHERN PLANTATION ECON-
oMy AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 15 (1978).
8. 37 Ala. 366, 370 (1861) ("A slave cannot be the owner of property: all his acquisitions,
whether by gift, or by the earnings of his labor, belong to his master."); see also A. Leon Higgen-
botham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Property First Humanity Second: The Recognition of the
Slave's Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law, 50 Onio ST. L.J. 511 (1989).
9. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
10. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 95 (1965).
11. Looking at the census records for a fifty-year span covering 1865 to 1914, one writer
found that "[i]n 1910 the blacks lived, by and large, in the same areas they had inhabited in
1860. . . . In 1910, 45 percent of all Southern blacks lived in counties where blacks were a
majority of the total population; the corresponding figure had been 57 percent in 1880." ROB-
ERT HIGGS, COMPETITION AND COERCION: BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 1865-1914, at
28, 30 (1977).
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cases, the benefits accruing to slaveowners who profited by allowing
their slaves to transact business.12 While advantages to slaveowners
whose slaves generated income were the automatic result of a slave's
incapacity to own property and its consequent vesting in the slave-
owner, this outcome turned on the forthrightness of slave toward
owner. And that most compelling of reasons for slaves to acquire
money-buying their freedom or that of their families-inhibited
their already strained relations with whites. Illustrative of that human
dynamic is an 1845 narrative recounting the tale of Lunsford Lane, a
North Carolina slave, who hired his time from his owner and paid her
a portion of his earnings from the sale of pipes and tobacco.' 3 Over
eight years he accumulated a thousand dollars surreptitiously.
During this time I had found it politic to go shabbily dressed and to
appear to be very poor, but to pay my mistress for my services
promptly. I kept my money hid, never venturing to put out a penny
.... The thousand dollars was what I supposed my mistress would
ask for me, and so I determined now what I would do.14
What he did was to ask his owner what price she would accept for
him, then used a white man as intermediary in the purchase.
Hiring oneself out was a risk to both slave and owner in states
that prohibited the practice. Slaveowners were not immune from pun-
ishment if they failed to exercise discretion in giving a certain inde-
pendence to their slaves in jurisdictions that did not permit such
privileges. 15 Violation could result in the temporary confiscation of
the slave as the owner's property as well as a fine.16 Grounds for im-
posing such penalties were neither uncommon nor unknown to au-
thorities. In a footnote to his narrative, Lane commented:
It is contrary to the laws of the state [of North Carolina] for a slave
to have command of his own time... but in Raleigh it is sometimes
winked at. I knew one slave-man, who was doing well for himself,
taken up by the public authorities and hired out for the public good,
three times in succession for this offense. The time of hiring in such
a case is one year. The master is subject to a fine. But generally...
if the slave is orderly and appears to be making nothing, neither he
nor the master is interfered with) 7
12. See, e.g., WILLIAM HAYDEN, NARRATIVE OF WILLIAM HAYDEN: CONTAINING A FAITH-
FUL ACCOUNT OF His TRAVELS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, WHILST A SLAVE, IN THE SOUTH
(1846).
13. THE NARRATIVE OF LUNSFORD LANE, BLACK MEN IN CHAINS 102 (Charles H. Nichols
ed., 1972) [hereinafter LUNSFORD LANE].
14. Id. at 103.
15. See State v. Woodman, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 213 (1824) (upholding North Carolina's stat-
ute barring an owner from allowing a slave to act on his or her own.).
16. Id. at 213-14.
17. LUNSFORD LANE, supra note 13, at 102.
19941
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What emerged was an unequal collusion between slave and owner in
the matter of the slave's working for gain; a collusion that owners-
when they knew of it-assumed to be for their benefit, and that slaves
calculated to be for theirs.
B. Free Persons of Color During Slavery
The South's conduct toward free persons of color provides a com-
parison for its later behavior after military defeat and the loss of
human property. Although some free persons gained their freedom
for service during the Revolutionary War, others acquired their free-
dom under state laws permitting private manumissions by owners. 18
Frequently, such acts were testamentary. For example, in Fisher's Ne-
groes v. Dabbs'9 the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized emancipa-
tion by will or deed, but only as an "imperfect right until the state...
assents to the contract between the master and the slave."'20 The law
governing such private manumissions gave the court a discretionary
role in approving or denying what the court characterized as a "con-
tract,"'21 prohibited free persons of color from other states from enter-
ing Tennessee, and required that manumitted slaves be immediately
transported beyond the borders of the United States.22 Interpreting
legislative intent in this 1834 opinion, the court implicitly admitted
that fear was the foundation of the deportation provision. "Degraded
by their color and condition in life, the free negroes are a very danger-
ous and most objectionable population where slaves are numerous. '23
In contrast to the Dabbs opinion, even when Tennessee prohib-
ited manumission, unless the slave left the state, its supreme court as-
serted that the "slave['s] humanity conferred certain legal rights to
freedom. ' 24 For example, one analysis of Ford v. Ford25 described the
reasoning of Justice Nathan Green as "a singularly libertarian view of
18. See MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 5, at 50.
19. 14 Tenn. (6 Yet.) 119, 126 (1834).
20. Id.
21. The idea of a contractual relationship between owner and slave, which could be legally
binding, was inherently contrary to the laws governing slavery. Id. at 127.
22. Id. at 128-29.
23. Id. at 126.
24. Arthur F. Howington, "Not in the Condition of a Horse or an Ox:" Ford v. Ford, the
Law of Testamentary Manumission, and the Tennessee Court's Recognition of Slave Humanity, in
THE LAW OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 310, 322 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987); see also Jacob I. Corrd,
Thinking Property at Memphis: An Application of Watson, 68 Cm.-KErrr L. REV. 1373 (1993).
25. 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 91 (1846) (concerning a devise to certain slaves of freedom and land
under their owner's will).
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slavery which emphatically underscored the humanity of the slave." 26
The Tennessee high court's more lenient application of the law than
the statutory language might warrant did not, however, resolve the
issue of equality in a slave's favor. "This tension between the de-
mands of the law and the demands of social control produced the er-
ratic quality of Tennessee manumission legislation. '27 Insinuated
throughout legislative enactment and judicial opinion was the need to
"save the community from the evils of a free negro population." 28
The federal Constitution preserved the importation of slaves until
1808 and otherwise protected the institution directly and indirectly.29
Judicial decisions in some southern states after 1808 reflect the re-
gion's absolute independence in its administration of laws regulating
slavery. An 1838 Alabama decision, for example, invalidated a testa-
mentary provision freeing the decedent's slaves on the ground that a
"legacy" of freedom was incompatible with a slave's lack of "capacity
to take property, either by purchase or descent."3 Alabama had a
statute permitting manumission, but it gave the court unconditional
discretion to grant or deny an owner's request. 31 A margin for abuse
inhered in the process since the judge ultimately decided whether
meritorious service was sufficient to warrant approval.
Likewise, southern legislatures devised aggressive means for pro-
moting the institution by such means as sentencing. Criminal acts
could lead to sale into slavery. In a challenge to that penalty under
the laws of Virginia, the state's supreme court rejected the argument
26. Howington, supra note 24, at 319. The Tennessee manumission law was only in force
from 1842 until 1849. Id. at 321.
27. Id. at 322.
28. Boon v. Lancaster, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 583, 583 (1854).
29. The United States Constitution provided, "The Migration or Importation of such Per-
sons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight .... U.S. CONsT. art. I § 9.
Besides Article I, Section 9, Clause 1, which "prohibited Congress from banning the African
slave trade before 1808, but did not require Congress to end the trade after that date," other
provisions "explicitly sanctioning" the institution included: the three-fifths clause by which slaves
would have proportional representation, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, amended by U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV; and the fugitive slave clause "requir[ing] that runaways be returned to their owners 'on
demand."' U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional
Convention: Making a Covenant with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE
CONsTrrtroN AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 190-92 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987);
cf. DONALD E. LIVELY, THE CoNsTrruTION AND RACE 4 (1992) ("The original ordering of con-
stitutional priorities resulted in a charter that neither directly endorsed nor prohibited but none-
theless accommodated slavery.").
30. Trotter v. Blocker, 6 Port. 269, 290 (Ala. 1838).
31. As a prerequisite to the court's determination, the law provided that the "owners shall
make publication in some newspaper ... where such slave or slaves reside ... for at least sixty
days previous to the making application" to the county court. Id. at 293.
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that it violated the state's constitution.32 The court construed consti-
tutional language as excluding all persons of African descent.
Notwithstanding the general terms used in the Bill of Rights, it is
undeniable that it never was contemplated, or considered, to extend
to the whole population of the State. Can it be doubted, that it not
only was not intended to apply to our slave population, but that the
free blacks and mulattoes were also not comprehended in it ....
The numerous restrictions imposed on [free blacks and mulattoes]
in our Statute Book, many of which are inconsistent with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, both of this State and of the United
States, as respects the free whites, demonstrate, that, here, those
instruments have not been considered to extend equally to both
classes of our population.33
Nor was conviction of a criminal offense the only prerequisite to
the threat of enslavement. The United States Supreme Court agreed
with the courts of Kentucky and Mississippi that persons of color in
slaveholding states were presumed to be slaves.34 As framed before
the high court in Hall v. United States,35 the issue arose from a petition
to the court of claims in which Hall, "a man of color," sought the
proceeds from the sale of cotton seized in 1863 by the federal army
and "converted into money. ' 36 Hall claimed to have been born free
despite disputed findings that he had lived as a slave. Against the
opposing claims of Roach, his alleged owner who also sought the pro-
ceeds, Hall testified that in satisfaction of Roach's debt to Hall for the
latter's raising of livestock on Roach's plantation, he received the cot-
ton. The court accepted the finding that Hall had no title to the cotton
and concluded that, as a slave, he could not have contracted with his
master to receive it. Support for that conclusion lay in the absence of
any evidence that Hall had sought freedom under the laws of Missis-
sippi. Thus, "[h]is color was presumptive proof of bondage." 37
Although the case was submitted and decided in 1876, the Supreme
Court would not make the Civil War amendments retroactive. In-
stead the Court reasoned, "This case must be determined as if slavery
had not been abolished in Mississippi, and the laws referred to were
32. Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447 (1824).
33. Id. at 449.
34. See Davis v. Curry, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 238, 240 (1810) ("Color being one of the criteria by
which the African race is distinguished from the rest of the population of the country, must
consequently afford .. .a presumption of slavery upon which the master may rely until the
contrary is proven."); see also Hall v. United States, 2 U.S. 27 (1875).
35. Hall, 2 U.S 27.
36. ld. at 28.
37. Id. at 30.
[VCol. 70:439
PHANTOM FREEDOM
still in force there. ' 38 Although it is conceivable that some persons of
color made bogus claims of free status, going so far as to pursue them
in court, personal accounts testify to the desperate circumstances
awaiting a free person abducted and enslaved.39 Some states placed
such grave burdens on free persons wanting to remain free that the
state offered a foolproof exit from the labyrinth: voluntary
enslavement.4
The ease with which persons of color could transgress a multitude
of laws made them ever susceptible to dangers that fell short of en-
slavement. Legal changes denying access to skilled trades portended a
future marked by the abuses of contract labor and debt peonage.4 1
And as in other instances, recourse to the courts revealed the lengths
to which judges would accommodate the dominant group, laws on be-
half of blacks notwithstanding. In an 1855 case, a free person of color
was prosecuted before the mayor of Richmond for violating an ordi-
nance prohibiting persons of color from operating cook-shops.4 2 The
petitioner argued that his license under a state statute authorizing him
to conduct such a business was superior to the city ordinance. Even
strict attention to the belief systems of mid-nineteenth century Vir-
ginia cannot make the court's reasoning appear other than pretextual.
The court went farther than a mere decision "that the ordinance was
not in conflict with the act of assembly."4 3 It manufactured a compati-
bility consistent with the treatment accorded free blacks. Approving
the hierarchy that regulated relations between the races forced a sus-
pension of logic.
It was not the object, nor the effect of the act, to give to every per-
son who paid the tax and obtained a license to keep a cook-shop,
the right to do so .... If the ordinance would have been lawful, had
there been no such act, it is lawful notwithstanding the act; for there
is nothing in the act to render it unlawful."
This explanation depicts a wily legislature and a complicit court: cre-
ate a revenue-producing measure-taxed licenses, allow all free per-
sons to become licensees, then prosecute free persons of color
38. Id. at 30-31.
39. See generally MICHAEL KNIGHT, IN CHAINS TO LOUISIANA: SOLOMON NORTHUP'S
STORY (1971). First published in 1853, this account describes twelve years of enslavement culmi-
nating in unsuccessful charges against the narrator's kidnappers before the courts in his home
state of New York. Id.
40. See THEODoRE B. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SouTH 41 (1965) (describing the
law of Virginia before slavery's abolition).
41. See generally MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 5, at 98-100.
42. Mayo v. James, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 17 (1855).
43. Id. at 20.
44. Id.
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pursuant to an ordinance which prohibits them from using their
licenses.
Well-defined markers between free and slave dimmed with suc-
cessive legislative actions and judicial interpretations. As reminders
of what their racial counterparts did not have-freedom-free per-
sons of African descent became an irritant from which most southern
states sought relief by legal and ideological means. Those states
pushed to the limit a racial classification that could place white per-
sons at the greatest remove from the others and, in the process, ignore
the very existence of common qualities. Instead, white persons would
be consoled by the creed that "'[fjree negroes belong to a degraded
caste of society; they are in no respect on an equality with a white
man. According to their condition they ought by law to be compelled
to demean themselves as inferiors . . . ,,,45 The law complied and,
supported by social conventions, was "ready to serve as precedent[ I
for the regulation and control of the vastly expanded free Negro class
after emancipation. '" 46
II. DEFIANCE: THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
A. Military Necessity and Judicial Rejection
Freedom for slaves, embodied by what many regard as the defini-
tive turning point between slavery and freedom, began as "a means to
victory [for the federal army], not yet an end in itself."' 47 The Emanci-
pation Proclamation's significance is a thread in the sometimes tan-
gled debate over slavery's role in the Civil War. If abolishing slavery
was not the actual provocation for the war, then it became inextrica-
ble from it; an adjunct to it; and its leverage grew steadily with Con-
federate intransigence.
By July of 1862, President Lincoln, although greatly aggravated
by the secessionists, had not yet resolved to deprive the rebel South
entirely of its assets. But his willingness to allow some remnant of
past privilege was quickly fading. To the argument of Union General
George B. McClellan and others that slavery should not be forcibly
abolished, he replied, "This government cannot much longer play a
game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing. Those ene-
mies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten years trying
to destroy the government, and if they fail still come back into the
45. WILSON, supra note 40, at 27.
46. Id. at 41.
47. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BA1-rLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 502 (1988).
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Union unhurt. ' 48 When the majority of border state congressmen re-
fused his request to support a "plan for compensated emancipation,"
their response pushed the President "toward... [a] radical position,"
culminating in the initial Emancipation Proclamation two months
later.49
While those who have studied the era recognize that "[nlorthern
objectives originally consisted of saving the union but by war's end
had broadened to include the elimination of slavery,"50 others empha-
sized slavery's role as the "direct cause" of the war.5' Whatever the
vantage, slavery and secession were symbiotic when viewed through a
white southern lens: "[W]ithout slavery there would have been no
Black Republicans to threaten the South's way of life, no special
southern civilization to defend against Yankee invasion. '52
In September of 1862, President Lincoln issued a "preliminary"
proclamation stating that slaves in rebel states would be free as of
January 1, 1863.53 It was an ineffectual warning that subsequently de-
manded vigorous implementation. Speaking of the war's progression,
a noted sociologist theorized that "[t]he cause of liberating the Ne-
groes ... became... a much-needed strengthening moral justification
to the North. ' 54 The preliminary proclamation's aim to make the re-
bellious South lay down its arms rather than risk wholesale emancipa-
tion did not mean that capitulation would restore its slaves. Expressly
excepted, slaves and property to which legitimate claims could be
made by third persons no longer figured in the victor-vanquished
equation.5 5 It was predictable on that point alone that the states in
rebellion would find the executive offer worthless because it would
not adequately benefit them.
Even after the Civil War state courts routinely declared the Proc-
lamation to be of no effect. Acknowledging it would have meant,
among other things, that slaves could not be distributed as part of an
48. Id. at 502-03.
49. Id. at 503-04.
50. LIVELY, supra note 29, at 39.
51. RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 16 (1969).
52. MCPHERSON, supra note 47, at 311.
53. Act of Sept. 22, 1862, 12 Stat. 1267 (1862); see also MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 5, at
142.
54. 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 431 (1972).
55. See generally JONATHAN T. DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LiNcoLN AND
JOHNSON 34 (1953).
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
estate. The South Carolina Court of Errors in Pickett v. Wilkins5 6
asserted:
[Emancipation] was, in fact, accomplished by the conquest of the
country. Until that took place, slavery continued after the procla-
mation, just as it had existed before, and it ceased to exist in the
different parts of the State as they fell into the hands of the con-
queror. The proclamation was, in effect, simply an advertisement of
what would be a certain consequence of conquest.5 7
Mississippi resorted to a more universal code of conduct between con-
queror and conquered to support its position.58
It is a doctrine unknown to the laws of nations, that one belligerent
can, by a mere proclamation or military order, change the civil sta-
tus of the persons residing in the interior of an enemy's country, or
their rights of property, over which the belligerent has no present
power to enforce any order.59
By this reasoning the court held enforceable a contract involving pay-
ment for slaves hired out.
B. Nullification of Congressional Support
A corollary to the Emancipation Proclamation was the Act of
Congress freeing the wives and children of slaves who volunteered as
soldiers in the federal army.60 If rebellious states found ample justifi-
cation for ignoring a presidential proclamation, they would hardly dig-
nify a congressional directive with greater compliance. Their
nominally loyal neighbors, exempt from the Proclamation and con-
gressional provisions, commended their opposition. In an elaborate
opinion, written several months after the Civil War, Kentucky's high-
est court served as apologist for southern disobedience by fashioning
an argument based on the federal Constitution.61 The plaintiff in
Corbin had sued to recover his slave, a woman who had left his prem-
ises and had been hired by the defendant who believed that the Act of
56. 42 S.C.L. (13 Rich.) 366 (1867).
57. Id. at 368. The case arose from a claim by distributees, to whom only slaves were given
in an 1864 partition of the disputed estate. Plaintiffs requested either contributions from the
other heirs or a new partition "exclusive of the negroes... [who] were not property when the
partition took place." Id. at 367. In the decree dismissing plaintiffs' claim, an act upheld on
appeal, the court interpreted the Emancipation Proclamation as having no effect on the "fact" of
slaves who continued to be treated as such "long after the 1st of January, 1863." Id. at 371.
58. Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. Green, 42 Miss. 436 (1869).
59. Id. at 438. Lending weight to the court's argument was its finding that the President had
never "asserted or assumed" the power under the Constitution to abolish slavery and that his
exceptions to the application of the Proclamation "show[ed] that it was purely a military order."
Id.
60. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, §§ 12-13, 12 Stat. 597, 599 (1862).
61. Corbin v. Marsh, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 193 (1865).
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Congress duly authorized the freeing of all female slaves whose hus-
bands volunteered for service in the federal army.62 In reviewing the
trial court's decision for the plaintiff, the court considered two ques-
tions: whether "Congress [had] power to emancipate [the soldier
slave's] wife and children," and, "if [such] power existed, [whether it
was] exercised so as constitutionally to divest the owner of that wife of
his legal title to her."'63 Deciding against congressional authority on
both counts, the majority upheld the lower court. The court's unassail-
able point of departure was that the Constitution of the United States
"is as supreme in war as in peace." It rejected Congress' action, ini-
tially denouncing the failure to provide for compensation.
It would be inexplicably strange and inconsistent to admit, as all do,
that Congress cannot, in time of peace, take private property for
public use without just compensation, and, nevertheless, to claim, as
some seem to do, the power to take it without any compensation in
time of war, when all such property is in most danger of spoliation,
and in most need of the protection of this boasted palladium.65
As the dissent in Corbin remarked, a supplemental Act did pro-
vide for compensation to loyal masters of up to three hundred dollars
for slaves who volunteered to serve in the military.66 The dissent also
justified the distinction between compensation for soldier slaves but
not their immediate families on the ground of financial expediency.
Considering the disputed Act's possible relevance to Kentucky, it
urged temporary sacrifice to the greater cause of supporting the
government.67
62. Id. at 196.
63. Id. at 196-97. The court did not address the apparent inapplicability of the Act to Ken-
tucky as a state that was not in rebellion. Section 13 of the Act stated:
That when any man or boy of African descent, who by the laws of any State shall owe
service or labor to any person who, during the present rebellion, has levied war or has
borne arms against the United States, or adhered to their enemies by giving them aid
and comfort, shall render any such service as is provided for in this act, he, his mother
and his wife and children, shall forever thereafter be free, any law, usage, or custom
whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, That the mother, wife and chil-
dren of such man or boy of African descent shall not be made free by the operation of
this act except where such mother, wife or children owe service or labor to some person
who, during the present rebellion, has borne arms against the United States or adhered
to their enemies by giving them aid and comfort.
§ 13, 12 Stat. at 599.
64. Corbin, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) at 194.
65. Id. at 196.
66. Id. at 204-05 (Williams, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 228-29. As the dissent observed,
The slave soldiers from Kentucky, even at the price of $300 each, will amount to over
seven millions of dollars, the payment and fund being already provided for by law. The
other slaves set free by the last enactment may be safely set down at 75,000, and, at the
price of $300 each, would amount to over twenty-two millions of dollars. Now, if these
slaves have been emancipated by the direct, immediate, legal action of the government,
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Of some moment in the majority's reasoning was the difference
between governmental acts directed at rebelling states, and the grati-
tude expected by faithful states like Kentucky. It is exposed as a false
dichotomy as soon as the court makes a plea for federal restraint to-
ward its errant neighbors.
Insurgent citizens of Tennessee were still, de jure, citizens of the
United States-they were not national belligerents-they were not
absolved from their original obligations to the Federal Constitution
as their supreme law, nor deprived of their title to its protection;
and the suppression of the insurrection neither needed nor author-
ized the abolition of all the slaves in their State by the Federal
government. 68
This implicit charge of greed by the government recurs in the context
of emancipating soldier slaves when securing their use for the rebel-
lion's duration would suffice. 69 Rather than an objection to un-
dercompensation, the court's disapproval in reality lay with the
freedom that accompanied a soldier slave's service. The South was
more likely to physically lose slaves to Union lines as soldiers than to
lose women encumbered with children. Female slaves could expect
little to no support from most white persons, and ultimately had no-
where to go.
Prudent but unheeded in its plea for compliance, the dissent re-
garded patience as the more beneficial course.
Should all these acts of Congress be pronounced unconstitutional,
then these slaves have not been made free by law, but are still
slaves, and will so remain until, by the adoption of the constitutional
amendment, now pending, they shall be declared free; and being so
declared by constitutional amendment, no compensation will ever
be granted by Congress. 70
Eventual "public justice" was too weak an incentive for the ma-
jority. It considered enticement into service by declaring a slave's
wife or child free an unpalatable means to an intolerable end-perma-
nent deprivation of property.
the loyal slaveholder has the great claim of justice on his Government, that whilst he
suffers in common with all others, contributes of his earnings and substance equally
with all others, that it would be unjust, and contrary to the great policy of public justice
declared by the Constitution, that his slave property should also be taken for the public
benefit and compensation therefor withheld. If these slaves of Kentucky, so freed,
should perchance belong to loyal owners, their claims would amount to near thirty
millions of dollars, and will be the only savings possible out of the great wreck of his
property incident to the rebellion.
Id.
68. Id. at 197.
69. Id. at 198.
70. Id. at 229 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE: THE THIRTEENTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
A. Abolition of Slavery by Constitutional Amendment
On December 6, 1865 the states ratified the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, which provided that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction. '71
Although it clearly abolished slavery, and as a constitutional edict
was mandatory, it left unanswered: what status were the newly freed
then to assume? Did it in fact "establish[ ] civil rights as an incident of
freedom"? 72 Antagonism to it was swift, fueled in part by the Presi-
dent. As one scholar has written, "[President Johnson] maintained
that the amendment only abolished the institution of slavery and did
not alter the preexisting relationship between nation and states. '73
This implication of intact sectional autonomy, with its predictable
reluctance to change old ways, was at odds with a society of self-deter-
mining, if not classless, individuals-the former slaves. As has been
observed:
[T]he case of those who resisted the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment was built almost entirely on opposition to the expan-
sion and consolidation of the national power. With slavery already
dead, that expansion and consolidation would be neither great nor
of continuing importance if the amendment effected only a 'simple
exemption from personal servitude.' 74
1. Legislative Opposition in the South
Most repugnant of all responses to the amendment was the enact-
ment of Black Codes by southern states in 1865 and 1866. 75 These
stratagems were conceived at the behest of constitutional conven-
tions-themselves perfunctory affairs designed to make the minimum
revisions acceptable to the federal government76-and preceded Re-
71. U.S. CoQsr. amend. XIII, § 1.
72. LIVELY, supra note 29, at 41.
73. Id. at 44.
74. TENBROEK, supra note 10, at 162.
75. On the evolution, implementation, and demise generally of these laws see WILSON,
supra note 40.
76. Southern states' maneuvers attest to this:
On the question of slavery several of the conventions sought to save face. Some per-
sons in Mississippi did not wish to convey the idea that they were giving up slavery
voluntarily... [although Mississippi] finally passed a resolution abolishing the institu-
tion. South Carolina chose to forbid the reestablishment of slavery after asserting that
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construction. They subjected persons of African descent to many of
the indicia of slavery in order to exploit their labor, divide families,
extract their assets, and restrict their chances for acquiring assets.
In Mississippi, for example, probate courts had authority to ap-
prentice children "to some competent and suitable person" on a find-
ing of nonsupport by their parents. 77 Several provisions made clear
the law's design in creating a facsimile of slavery to the extent possi-
ble. In the matter of designating a suitable person, "the former owner
of said minors shall have the preference. ' 78 And although temporary
in duration, the "apprentice shall be bound by indenture, in case of
males until they are twenty-one years old, and in case of females until
they are eighteen years old."' 79 Flight from this arrangement
authorized
[the] master or mistress... [to] pursue and recapture said appren-
tice, and bring him or her before any justice of the peace of the
county .... [I]n the event of a refusal on the part of said apprentice
so to return, then said justice shall commit said apprentice to the jail
of said county on failure to give bond, until the next term of the
county court.8°
South Carolina forbade a person of color to work in a skilled
trade unless the man or woman had been apprenticed in it or was
already in it. Black merchants were required to pay hefty sums as
license fees and in all instances of trade or commerce a court had to
approve the person's "good moral character" as a prerequisite to con-
tinuing in business.81
slaves had been 'emancipated by action of the United States authorities.' Georgia in-
serted a clause in its new constitution acknowledging the abolition of slavery but added
a proviso that the people of the state did not give up their right to ask compensation for
slaves emancipated.
JoHN H. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCnON: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 41 (1961).
77. Act of Nov. 22, 1865, ch. 5, § 1, 1865 Miss. Laws 86, 87.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 2 at 87.
80. Id. § 4 at 87-88.
81. Act of Dec. 21, 1865, No. 4733, 1865 S.C. Acts 291. Section LXXII of the Act read, in
pertinent part:
No person of color shall pursue or practice the art, trade or business of an artisan,
mechanic or shop keeper, or any other trade, employment or business (besides that of
husbandry, or that of a servant under a contract for service or labor,) on his own ac-
count and for his own benefit, or in partnership with a white person, or as agent or
servant of any person, until he shall have obtained a license therefor from the Judge of
the District Court; which license shall be good for one year only. This license the Judge
may grant upon petition of the applicant, and upon being satisfied of his skill and fit-
ness, and of his good moral character, and upon payment, by the applicant, to the Clerk
of the District Court of one hundred dollars, if a shop-keeper or peddler, to be paid
annually, and ten dollars if a mechanic, artisan, or to engage in any other trade also to
be paid annually ....
Id. § LXXII at 299.
[Vol. 70:439
PHANTOM FREEDOM
The restrictions on persons of color from working at occupations
outside of farming, in this crucial juncture between slavery's end and
the point at which self-reliance would be made possible by Recon-
struction measures, caused significant consequences. Trades had
flourished during slavery. Large plantations had "substantial numbers
of skilled slave artisans" whose value for hire corresponded to their
expertise. "This select group of slave craftsmen included engineers,
coopers, carpenters, blacksmiths, brickmakers, stone masons, mechan-
ics, shoemakers, weavers, millers, and landscapers. ' '83 Household ser-
vants in well-ordered residences likewise demonstrated specialization
of the highest quality.84 For several decades to more than a century
slave artisans dominated certain trades. "[I]n the eighteenth century,
and perhaps down to 1830, the slave's dominance in the mechanical
arts in the Old South was not challenged. 85
Well before the Civil War some southern cities had taken meas-
ures to end the competition from black skilled workers; Charleston,
South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia are examples.86 "[A]n 1831
Savannah ordinance ... said blacks could not be apprenticed to the
'trade of Carpenter, Mason, Bricklayer, Barber, or any other Mechan-
ical Art or Mystery."' 87 Post-bellum restrictions like those in South
Carolina's Black Code and their subsequent statutory transformations
effectively removed many opportunities for blacks to learn trades and
professions.
Also inhibited by the Codes were commercial dealings involving
persons of color. North Carolina's 1866 Code, for example, required
blacks to have a white person as a witness when they contracted "for
the sale of certain animals or for any article of the value of ten dollars
or more." 88
82. KENNETH M. STAMPP, TmE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM
SOUTH 41 (1972).
83. Id. at 59.
84. Id.
85. LESLIE H. OWENS, Tins SPECIES OF PROPERTY: SLAVE LnE AND CULTURE IN THE OLD
SOUTH 177 (1976). This same author, citing an 1837 review, quoted, "'[S]ome of the best tailors
and mantuamakers in the southern states are slaves. In the cities, all of the hair-dressers and
barbers, many of the butchers, and sundry of the tavern-keepers, are slaves or free negroes."' Id.
at 179; see also HERBERT G. GUTMAN, SLAVERY AND THE NUMBERS GAME 54 (1975) (Extrapo-
lating from 1848 census figures for Charleston, South Carolina, the author concluded that "the
absolute number of slave artisans would have increased by about 40 percent between 1848 and
1860 and that two out of five slaves ... would have been artisans," despite a reduction of 25
percent in the adult male slave population "between 1850 and 1860.").
86. GUTMAN, supra note 85, at 52.
87. Id.
88. WILSON, supra note 40, at 106.
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The federal legislative and executive branches disagreed on the
iniquity of the Codes. James Henry Lane, Republican Senator from
Kansas stated: "This, then, is slavery, less the protection which the
master formerly afforded his chattel. The slave now has a mob for his
master." 89 However, according to one historian, "President Johnson
had acquiesced in the Black Codes without a murmur. On December
18, 1865... he made an oblique reference to them as 'measures ... to
confer upon freedmen the privileges which are essential to their com-
fort, protection, and security. '" '9
Although military orders invalidated some Black Codes, the cli-
mate of white dominion lingered. At least one state, Alabama, did
not need a Black Code: it had delayed repealing its prewar slave code
until 1867.91
Ironically, the North's military command may have encouraged
the enactment of the Codes. Andrew Johnson's transition to presi-
dent suspended the finalizing of amnesty provisions that his predeces-
sor had begun. While Johnson's sentiments on this issue were
regarded as more harsh than Lincoln's, General Sherman, at this am-
biguous juncture, had made representations to Confederate General
Joseph Johnston assuring a return to the status quo. They agreed that,
once all Confederate armies were decommissioned, the rebellious
states would resume their governance and, most importantly, "civil,
political, personal, and property rights [would] be guaranteed to the
inhabitants of the states lately in rebellion." 92 Since Lincoln's Eman-
cipation Proclamation had specifically excluded slaves as returnable
property to surrendering states, theirs would be a limbo status. John-
son never agreed to the Sherman-Johnston accord and the specter of
southern rebels exempt from all reprisals, save one, disappeared.
Whatever inclination toward leniency the North manifested, however,
emboldened the South if only temporarily. This was a propitious in-
terlude that favored southern white designs. For nearly two years the
South could use Black Codes to trivialize and avenge the North's tri-
umph. Ultimately, Johnson's policies and the South's self-interest as
states readmitted to the Union would demand a compliance that was
more reflective of national cooperation. As later events would
demonstrate, however, southern white compromise was not to be con-
fused with meekness. Likewise, the consensus among those officials
89. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 3, at 589.
90. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, at 81 (1965).
91. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 114.
92. DoRms, supra note 55, at 98.
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who passed Black Codes throughout the region and the indispensable
support for vigilante organizations during Reconstruction belie claims
of general ignorance of the violence existing during the Code years
and immediately thereafter. 93
2. The Frailty of Enforcement Legislation
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment provided, "Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. '94
In response to the animosity the Black Codes typified, Congress, over
presidential veto, passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 95 The first sec-
tion stated in part:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power ... are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and ... shall have the same right, in every State and Terri-
tory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. 96
Although it did not offer an exhaustive definition of civil rights be-
yond the limited enumeration quoted above, by targeting state laws
and officials, it was destined to face southern condemnation.
Allowing persons of color to not only conduct themselves in ways
designed to preserve their safety, but also to increase their wealth
made freedom of economic gain a significant focus.97 Consistent with
this idea is the view that civil "rights traditionally had been defined by
the state ... and had been perceived largely in economic terms. Incip-
ient federal interest in securing them ... evinced no consensus for
altering their linkage to material considerations. 98 This is not to min-
imize the Act's attention to judicial access and personal security. At
the same time, however, granting to blacks contractual rights equal to
93. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 85 ("That some Negroes were abused or murdered every-
one in the South knew, but it is likely that many southerners had no knowledge of the extent of
such atrocities.").
94. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 2.
95. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat 27 (1866).
96. d.
97. Contractual freedom was not, of course, superior to limitations on rights to acquire
licenses. Even if a state did not expressly prohibit persons of color from obtaining trade or
professional licenses, it accomplished this effect indirectly by placing in their paths impediments
to the educational requirements on which some trades were conditioned.
98. LIVELY, supra note 29, at 45.
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those of whites could potentially reverse decades of restrictions and
impediments in an area that slavery had, as a matter of law, foreclosed
altogether.
Although circumscribed in application and left to states to admin-
ister, the Act was an intrusion nevertheless. In 1867 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals declared it unconstitutional. 99 In particular, the
court challenged the superiority of the Act in allowing persons of
color to give evidence against white persons.
Each State, so far as not prohibited by her own Constitution or that
of the United States, has the unquestionable right to regulate her
own domestic concerns, and prescribe remedies, including rules of
evidence, in cases in our own courts; and we presume that congress
would never assume authority to regulate the testimony of free
white citizens in State courts. The 'civil rights bill' has attempted no
such presumptuous absurdity. 1°°
Quoting both sections of the Thirteenth Amendment, the court went
on to say, "The utmost legal effort of the emancipating section was to
declare the colored as free as the white race in the United States. It
certainly gave the colored race nothing more than freedom. It did not
elevate them to social or political equality with the white race." 101
Congress' drafting of the Civil Rights Act resembled a tottering edi-
fice waiting for a high wind. The needs of a nation less than a century
old and recovering from an internal war required clarity, if not bold-
ness. But the Act's deficiencies were derivative of the Thirteenth
Amendment itself, a conclusion made irrefutable by the later passage
and application of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 10 2
Whether through a combination of naivete and optimism 10 3 or ambi-
99. Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5, 10 (1867).
100. Id. at 7.
101. Id. at 8.
102. Contrasting the three amendments led to this assessment by two constitutional
historians:
The Thirteenth Amendment, in imperial manner, forbade every American individ-
ual as well as every American government from holding persons in bondage; the Four-
teenth restrained only states, a growing consensus insisted. The Fifteenth added
strength to that consensus. While the Fifteenth inhibited both national and state ac-
tions, it did not constrain individuals' behavior-if the Thirteenth was assumed to have
been superseded or was otherwise ignored.
And that is what happened. Between 1870 and the mid-1880s, administrators,
judges, lawyers, and legislators all but lost sight of the Thirteenth Amendment as the
standard by which to measure the nation's duty to every individual as against every
other person or unit of government, concerning defenses of national rights.
HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW. CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 464 (1982).
103. See id. at 391 (describing the view of a Louisiana Republican in 1865, the authors wrote,
"'many good lawyers' among Republicans thought the enforcement clause [of the Thirteenth
Amendment] superfluous").
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guity brought about by the context of the time, a context which "[did]
not suggest a tightly limited meaning for the Thirteenth Amend-
ment,"'1 4 imprecision inhered in it.
[T]he Congressmen of 1865, creating the Thirteenth Amendment,
failed fully to specify their immediate intentions. But positive en-
forcement was part of the Thirteenth Amendment's context. En-
forcement of what? Of protection.., from involuntary servitude
and violence, and of all the full and equal rights of freedom, some of
which history had identified and a multitude of which remained for
the inscrutable future to reveal.' 05
Southern states had shown a resistance to every measure that
would have enhanced the condition of former slaves; the Act's short-
comings invited a court like that in Bowlin to distort the intended goal
into something unrecognizable. Prior to the bill's passage, certain
members of Congress made the same criticism as the Bowlin court:
the bill exceeded Congressional authority under the Thirteenth
Amendment. °6 Even the abolitionist and Republican Representa-
tive, John Bingham, who drafted the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, opposed the Act for, among other reasons, its inapplica-
bility to non-citizens, a defect which he believed directly violated con-
stitutional principles.
This bill... departs from [the Constitution of the United States].
The alien is not a citizen. You propose to enact this law, you say, in
the interests of the freedmen. But do you propose to allow these
discriminations to be made in States against the alien and stranger?
Can such legislation be sustained by reason or conscience .... Is it
not as unjust as the unjust State legislation you seek to remedy?
Your Constitution says 'no person,' not 'no citizen,' 'shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property,' without due process of law.
If the bill of rights ... does not limit the powers of States and
prohibit such gross injustice by States, it does limit the power of
Congress and prohibit any such legislation by Congress. 1 7
Of greater significance, the President's veto message presaged the
criticisms raised in Bowlin while calling attention to the possibility of
enfranchisement for persons of color, a topic unaddressed by the
Act.108 As an ineffectual attempt at advancing the authority of the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Act could not withstand the almost mat-
ter-of-fact states rights argument put forth by Bowlin. That decision
declaimed ultimately against the evils that observance of the Act
104. Id. at 389.
105. Id. at 390.
106. See, e.g., CONO. GLOBE, supra note 3, at 1156-57 (statement of Rep. Thornton).
107. Id. at 1292.
108. Id. at 1679-81.
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would surely promote and, in recalling the President's veto message,
unmasked a regional fear of extinction of a civilization.
Such a monstrous construction of the second clause [of the Thir-
teenth Amendment] would yield to the arbitrary will of Congress
absolute control over the interests and destiny of the black race, and
the like control over the white race, so far as its rights might, in the
opinion of Congress, conflict with the interest of the blacks. And on
this theory Congress might take from white citizens their property
and give it to black citizens; and might, as assumed in the 'civil
rights bill,' legislate over all contracts in the States to which black
citizens are, in any way, parties. And the unqualified 'same power
to make and enforce contracts' attempted to be given by that bill to
black citizens would legalize intermarriages between the two races
deteriorating to the Caucasian blood, and destructive of the social
and legislative decorum of States. 1°9
B. A Constitutional Declaration of Rights
Part of the language of the Civil Rights Act reappeared in the
Thirteenth Amendments's final by-product, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which was ratified in 1868. "By-product" because neither the
earlier amendment nor its enforcing legislation, the Civil Rights Act,
had successfully impressed on the South that persons of color were
more than merely free. Section 1 provided:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without the due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 0
Despite the apparent resolution of the citizenship issue, state
courts found room to maneuver around the amendment's direct pre-
scription."' This was an unsurprising result in view of the amend-
ment's hard-won ratification process, made so by southern obstinacy
and northern indecision.
Before the end of 1866 Texas, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
North Carolina, Arkansas, and Alabama had rejected the Four-
teenth Amendment. In the first months of 1867 Virginia, Louisiana,
and Mississippi turned it down ....
* Aside from Connecticut and New Hampshire ... most of
the other Northern states either dragged their feet or gave no imme-
109. Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5, 9 (1867).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. See, e.g., McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320,323 (1883) (holding that one may be a citizen of
a state and yet not a citizen of the United States).
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diate consideration to the Amendment .... Gradually, in the win-
ter and spring of 1867 the Northern states ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, but not before they had set a bad example for the
Southern states.112
Privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection were
phrases that sounded as much like a moral imperative as a legal man-
date. On both levels they furnished courts with decades of opportu-
nity for interpretation. This second Reconstruction amendment
amplified a national message of rights for former slaves, but its com-
mand that states refrain from enacting repressive laws or depriving
citizens of rights was an abstraction. Southern states had so far shown
no inclination to assist voluntarily in the rehabilitation of former
slaves despite the prod of the earlier constitutional amendment, fed-
eral legislation, and a continued federal military presence. Efforts by
Congress to redeem the aims of the Fourteenth Amendment with ap-
propriate enforcement legislation were likewise hindered by federal
courts unwilling to invade the states-rights sanctum. 113
Within two years enfranchisement for persons of African descent
was promised with the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.
"Black suffrage ... presented an opportunity to end the post-war era
and its seemingly intractable problems."'1 4 Coinciding with the rise of
terror throughout the South, this last Civil War amendment proved a
harbinger of what was to come-although not in the foreseeable fu-
ture. At the time of its adoption, it was fresh fuel to a fire of bigotry
that would alternately blaze and smolder.
IV. AVOIDANCE AND COLLABORATION: MOB RULE,
THE CLIMATE OF INDULGENCE, AND
RECONSTRUCTION'S TENUOUS GAINS
A. Methods of Abuse
1. The Ku Klux Klan
Contemporaneous with the war amendments were the creation
and dispersion of terrorist organizations devoted to the cause of white
supremacy."l 5 Noteworthy among these groups was the Ku Klux
112. FRANKLIN, supra note 76, at 67-68.
113. See infra part V.
114. LIVELY, supra note 29, at 54.
115. See, e.g., 2 WALTER L. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 331
(1907). Testimony included in an Alabama report on the Ku Klux Klan identified the growth of
Union League chapters as "the prime moving cause" of the Klan's existence. Id. This is but
another variation on the white supremacy theme as membership in the League, begun as white
loyalist societies, became nearly all black after the war. Additionally, protection of white wo-
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Klan, hatched in the offices of a Tennessee judge with the help of six
wellborn ex-Confederates, including the judge's son.116 Although
there were many other groups that furthered white supremacy, the
Klan, despite initially elaborate schemes to conceal its identity, was
the most infamous. 117 All of these groups recalled the wayward ele-
ment of slave patrollers. Under that earlier system, in some places
consisting of "all white males over eighteen," 118 the patrollers roamed
southern areas at night checking on or apprehending persons of color
who might or might not be slaves. Their official duties, often supple-
menting local militias, did not prevent gross abuses." 9
Conventional analysis of the Ku Klux Klan suggests that the para-
mount force behind its violence was political. To prevent the spread
or entrenchment of Republicanism in any form, the Klan would go to
any lengths. That many white persons were its victims makes this a
credible but superficial claim, as does the apparent truism that "[n]one
but Democrats belong or can belong to these societies."'1 20 But
"[long before Negroes became a political factor and while the gov-
ernments of the Southern states were still in the hands of the former
Confederates, the Klan organization was being perfected and was
spreading to many parts of the South.' 2' Additionally, extra-political
measures adopted in some of the defeated rebel states after the war
would have encouraged broader sympathies for the Klan. Before the
war in South Carolina, for example, the state derived most of its in-
come from a head tax on slaves. Afterwards, land was taxed more
heavily and the assessed value of property rose considerably. 122 The
manhood figured in the Alabama report as well as one from North Carolina. Recorded in 1871,
testimony from the latter state included the statement, "The poorer classes [of white women] ...
would only go [to town] when they could form large companies for mutual protection.... [T]hey
were afraid to go ... alone for fear of being insulted or ravished by negroes .... " Id. at 333.
116. For a definitive treatment on the Klan, see ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE
Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971).
117. Other known groups who committed atrocities in the region were members of the
."Regulators, Jayhawkers, the Black Horse Cavalry, the Knights of the White Camellia, the Con-
stitutional Union Guards, the Pale Faces, the White Brotherhood, the Council of Safety, the '76
Association, [and] the Rifle Clubs of South Carolina." LOGAN, supra note 51, at 21; see also
TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 81.
118. JOHN H. FRANKLIN, THE MILITANT SOUTH, 1800-1861, at 72 (1956).
119. See id. at 73; see also V. P. FRANKLIN, BLACK SELF-DETERMINATION: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN RESISTANCE 112-16 (1992).
120. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 437 (1871) (statement of Rep. Cobb).
121. FRANKLIN, supra note 76, at 154.
122. Lou F. Williams, The Constitution and the Ku Klux Klan on Trial: Federal Enforcement
and Local Resistance in South Carolina, 1871-1872, II GA. J. S. LEGAL HIsT. 46 (1993) ("[H]igh
property taxes, the primary source of state revenue in Reconstruction South Carolina, was a vast
change from pre-war policy, when a head tax on slaves had provided most of the state's income.
Real estate had been consistently undervalued for tax purposes .. "). But cf. FRANKLIN, supra
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shift was significant: underassessed land was a consolation for pre-war
taxes on slaves while post-war higher taxes on land carried no such
setoff. Radical Republicans hoped and planned for redistribution of
land to free persons through forfeiture of land to the state, which
would then resell it at modest cost. 123 It was a successful plan with a
predictable effect. "The Republican tax program released vast quanti-
ties of land .... But it also increased the antagonism of the majority
of the white citizens of the state-the property owners-toward the
government,"'1 24 which was heavily represented by free persons of
color.
The indiscriminateness of Klan violence against persons of Afri-
can descent, regardless of political affiliation or lack of it, demands a
broader explanation. Likewise, the continuation of violence beyond
1871, when the first wave of most statewide elections had concluded
as well as the frequent raids to seize weapons, provides evidence of
something other than factional motivation. 125 One ostensibly
nonpolitical target was education for former slaves. "In Mississippi
the Klan took on new life in 1870 in order to oppose the establishment
of schools for Negroes and to resist the new taxes that it regarded as
unreasonable.' 26 Whether it was discouraging black voters from go-
ing to the polls, providing a service to white landowners seeking to
prevent or undo the sale of land to persons of color, punishing a real
or imagined crime or insult to a white person, or simply running
amok, the Klan's ultimate cruelty was lynching. 27
note 76, at 142 ("To finance their operations the Radicals of South Carolina instituted a 'uniform
rate of assessment of all property at its fair money value,' in contrast to the ante-bellum system
that was easy on land and slaves and hard on mercantile, professional, and banking interests.").
123. Williams, supra note 122, at 46.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Caro-
lina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921, 927 (1984) (citing J. Williamson: "The
timing of the [Klan] riots, which occurred after the October 1870 elections ... and the loose
organization of the Klan suggest that they were more the product of collective social frustration
than political anxiety.").
126. FRANKIN, supra note 76, at 165. Certainly education had political implications as it
would prepare its beneficiaries to exercise politically-conferred rights.
127. There has always been debate over what constitutes lynching. In its narrowest sense, it
is the abduction and murder of one accused of a crime from the jurisdiction of a law enforcement
agent. A body of literature on the work of "Judge Lynch" began to grow at the end of the last
century. See, e.g., Charles J. Bonaparte, Lynch Law and Its Remedy, 8 YALE L.J. 335 (1899). In
its generic sense, used here, it incorporates vigilante acts after the Civil War and into this cen-
tury-roughly, a century; custody by law enforcement officials is not a prerequisite. Beginning
in 1882, Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, aided later by the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, gathered figures on lynchings throughout the country. In 1969
the Tuskegee Archive Coordinator for those figures wrote:
In an overwhelming majority of the instances of Negroes lynched the charge is some
offense against whites. The graver offenses-murder, rape, arson, assault-
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Documentation on Klan violence is plentiful. A congressional
committee, which convened in 1871 to take testimony about Klan ac-
tivity, listened to the account of a Mississippi black man who "was
whipped because he had not lifted his hat when he met a white man
on the road."128
Representative of the Klan's actions, with admittedly political
overtones, was the brutalizing in 1868 of Caswell Holt in North Caro-
lina on suspicion of theft. Holt lodged a formal complaint against his
attackers whom he recognized and who were arrested. Later released
for lack of evidence beyond Holt's word, they returned a year later to
shoot him, although not mortally. 129
In Georgia, refusal to join the Democratic Club earned Perry Jef-
fers an assault. His personal belongings were burned, his son killed,
and his wife hung. With his remaining family he abandoned the land
on which he was a tenant farmer and sought refuge in the local jail.
Klan threats ended the inquest into his son's death while the sheriff
and a Freedmen's Bureau agent advised him to flee by train. Forcibly
removed from a train coach, he was fatally shot.130
Henry Lowther, an "active Republican" in Georgia who had suc-
cessfully engaged in his trade, sued white persons for money due. The
Klan members who visited him shortly thereafter offered him the
choice of death or castration. He chose the latter and lived.' 31
Typical of Klan actions resulting in property loss was the South
Carolina murder of Tom Roundtree for "belligerence." Although de-
scribed as a "leader among the Negroes of the vicinity,' 32 his death
appears not to have been strictly politically motivated. The arrests
and conviction of some of the group who were identified by his widow
were thwarted by a "former legislator" who presided over the local
Klan council and who provided alibis for the accused. The Roundtree
family was forced to abandon its home and belongings.' 33
predominate; but in many cases the charges are of strikingly trivial sort, such as slap-
ping a white child, using offensive or boastful language, suing or testifying against a
white, expressing sympathy for a lynched Negro, or seeking employment in a restau-
rant. Another cause of lynchings is to be found in the quick and passionate resentment
among large sections of the southern whites against any gesture of equality on the part
of the Negro.
Daniel T. Williams, The Lynching Records at Tuskegee Institute; with Lynching in America A
Bibliography, in Eiojrr NEGRO BIBLIOGRAPmHES 2 (1970).
128. FRANKLIN, supra note 76, at 170.
129. TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 293.
130. Id. at 228-30.
131. Id. at 324.
132. Id. at 364.
133. Id. at 363-64.
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In instances like those above, denial of economic rights, including
the direct loss of property, has an individual focus. Descriptions of
property ownership on a collective scale show it to have been no less
vulnerable. In 1866, Georgia had "ninety-six schools supported in
whole or in part by the freedmen, who owned fifty-seven of the build-
ings." 134 Within two years it was the site of at least one assault on a
black teacher coupled with a warning to discontinue planning a
school; relocating the school to a nearby church led to that building's
deliberate destruction by fire. 135
Many atrocities occurred because of the withdrawal of federal
troops and the inability or unwillingness of local law enforcement to
act as a substitute. In some instances, however, the troops themselves
would not intervene. Evidence from Louisiana revealed the paradox
in a refusal by a garrison general to battle "fifteen thousand" Knights
of the White Camelia. Representative Benjamin F. Butler of Massa-
chusetts commented:
And yet [the Democratic major] general had under his command, to
enforce the laws of the United States in time of peace, in the city of
New Orleans, more United States troops than another general,
commanding there in 1862, had in the city with which to keep at bay
a rebel army. 136
Threats to personal security and opposition to acquiring property
or skills were overlapping obstacles with one frequently comple-
menting the other. In parts of Georgia "Klan activity was aimed more
exclusively at keeping the black man in his place economically and
socially," resulting in widespread murder and destruction with loss of
crops and possessions. 137 As one of the most notorious sites of Klan
terror, York County, South Carolina, saw many persons of African
descent flee leaving behind "homes, crops, and belongings."'138 It was
the large-scale violence in South Carolina that would precipitate a test
of enforcement legislation in federal court. 139
Although outrages attributable directly to the Klan declined in
the early 1870s, primarily because of federal intervention, other
groups or renegade Klansmen continued their attacks. In Louisiana,
after a three year hiatus, a reincarnated version of mob violence took
134. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 5, at 160.
135. TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 329.
136. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 120, at 444 (Representative Butler was referring to himself as
the "Democratic major general." A Union general, he changed his party affiliation from Demo-
cratic to Republican.).
137. TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 320.
138. Id. at 366.
139. See infra notes 228-35 and accompanying text.
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hold in 1872 "finally achiev[ing] the overthrow of the state govern-
ment in 1877."' 140 Attempts in Alabama to dissolve the Klan failed as
attacks continued. 41 The group's birthplace was no more successful
in eradicating raids by 1870.142 Mississippi fared as badly as
Tennessee. 43
By the early 1870s the Klan, although persisting, trailed off into
disorganized remnants marked by discord between those who favored
disbanding to avoid "military occupation"'1 or who disapproved of
the raids, 145 and those determined to continue. But the conditioning it
had fostered endured. The Mississippi Plan, begun in that state in
1875 and exported to South Carolina, Florida, and, with modifications,
Alabama, was unequivocally political in its end.
[Its architects and practitioners] organized themselves into irregular
militia companies and armed themselves with rifles. They drilled
and paraded through the areas of heavy Negro population; they en-
rolled Negro leaders in so-called 'dead-books'; they dispersed Re-
publican meetings; they forced Negroes at rifle point to listen to
Democratic speakers; they deliberately provoked riots in which
hundreds of Negroes were killed; and they posted armed pickets at
registration places to prevent Negroes from registering.146
2. Law Enforcement Undermined
TWo demonstrable facts combined to ensure the victimization of
persons of color: the refusal by sheriffs and others charged with law
enforcement to curb abuse through arrests of violators and defense of
the innocent; and the failure of judicial officers at all levels to prose-
cute in such a way as to obtain convictions followed by imprisonment.
Certainly, arrests and prosecutions occurred. But the frequency of
these in proportion to the pervasion of mistreatment was nearly
inconsequential.
Invariably, the judicial process at the state and local level was
overcome by manufactured alibis and intimidated witnesses, judges,
and prosecuting attorneys. 147 If prosecutions were begun, the ac-
140. TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 136.
141. Id. at 247.
142. Id. at 278.
143. Id. at 308.
144. Id. at 206 (North Carolina).
145. Id. at 247, 308 (Alabama).
146. STAMPP, supra note 90, at 201-02.
147. See TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 201.
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cused's supporters neutralized their effectiveness, among other means,
with well-financed defense teams.148
Legislative enactments designed to weaken the Klan's effect were
ignored. In Alabama, measures adopted in December of 1868 to com-
pensate victims for Klan attacks if they did not recover damages from
the offenders were worthless.149 Nor was a secret service fund estab-
lished in Mississippi in the spring of 1870 sufficient incentive to entice
informers into giving information leading to convictions of Klan
members.150
Meanwhile, fear of retribution impelled law enforcers in some
states to execute their mandates selectively. If a vigilante group held
sway in a locality or was perceived to rule, sheriffs and their deputies
would desist from interfering. The sheriffs in Sumter, Tuscaloosa, and
Huntsville, Alabama all deferred to Klan terror in 1868 and 1869.151
Documentation on this point and the futility in opposing the Klan
generally was provided to the Senate Committee during its investiga-
tion of the Klan prior to enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871.152 Testimony regarding the Klan in North Carolina, for exam-
ple, recounted the death of a sheriff for aiding in the arrest of a mem-
ber of the Klan.153 Contrary to being afraid, some law enforcement
agents-the sheriff in Crittenden County, Arkansas, for one-actively
participated in the Klan.15'
Local misconduct by sheriffs or deputies and scattered prosecu-
tions by lawyers and judges appear as uncatalogued examples sug-
gesting randomness or irregularity. A systematic disinterest in
defending persons of African descent, however, is observable indi-
rectly from the facts surrounding financial benefits for officials. Many
southern states used some variant of the fee system, which has been
described in connection with its early twentieth century form.
148. By the end of 1871 approximately 600 arrests had been made in South Carolina. The
state courts were ill-equipped to handle that volume, "and only the worst offenders were pro-
ceeded against with any seriousness." Id. at 406. Of those cases that came to trial in the United
States Circuit Court during that period there were five convictions. In North Carolina "a total of
763 indictments had been made .... Of this number, 23 pleaded guilty, 24 were tried and
convicted, 13 were acquitted, and 9 cases were dropped in a subsequent court term; the great
majority still awaited trial at the end of the year [1870]." Id. at 408. After a series of arrests in
1871, the Democratic legislature in North Carolina caused the release of those accused by "re-
peal[ing] the law on which the felony indictments were based." Id. at 409.
149. Id. at 246-47.
150. Id. at 277-78.
151. Id. at 247, 257, 263.
152. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 120, at 443-49.
153. Id. at 444 (quoted by Rep. Butler).
154. TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 167.
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
According to this plan, constables and other petty officers receive
no regular salaries, but are paid per capita persons arrested. Judges
and other officials receive a portion of the court costs. Such officers
are tempted to make as much as possible out of their position by
frequent arrests of Negroes for petty law violations.' 55
An example of this arrangement was a woman "convicted of using
'abusive language' and fined . . . . She worked out the fine in two
days, but it required nearly a year of labor to satisfy the 'costs' consist-
ing of fees to judge, sheriff, clerks and witnesses .... ,"156
These laws predated emancipation and, in their earliest days,
merely reflected the machinery for compensating court officials. Fol-
lowing the entrance of four million persons of color into free southern
society, southern lawmakers and law enforcers recognized another use
for the fee system. Especially after Reconstruction had ended, minor
breaches of sometimes vague laws made the system a device for con-
trolling blacks, whose omnipresence as free persons was found offen-
sive by many whites. Arrests and confinements helped supply the
labor needs of a white society that had yet to adapt to shifting labor
patterns. 15 7
The laws of nineteenth-century Arkansas typify the several levels
on which the fee system operated. Although judges of the county
courts received salaries and a two hundred dollar annual bonus, sher-
iffs and clerks were remunerated through fees "taxed as costs."'1 58
Conviction for a misdemeanor resulted in fines and costs which, if un-
paid, entitled the county to jail the convict until transfer to a contrac-
tor "at such place as the contractor may designate, who shall keep and
work such prisoner for the time he shall have been adjudged to be
imprisoned, and for the further time as will discharge all fines and costs
for which he may be committed .... ,,159 The contractor was the sole
arbiter of time necessary to work off the fine, a fact implicit in the
statute's wording. While the Justice of the Peace or the clerk had the
duty to file a document setting forth the sentence, fine, and costs, he
was also obligated to provide "a concise statement of the time such
155. JoHN G. VAN DEUSEN, THE BLACK MAN IN WHIrE AMERICA 146 (rev. ed. 1944).
156. Id.
157. The wage incentive used after emancipation to lure former slaves back to plantations
"failed to provide the manpower base essential to plantation agriculture." See MANDLE, supra
note 7, at 17. The evolution of the sharecropping system over the next twenty years and the
limitation on black employment outside the South by discrimination or anti-enticement laws was
like a funnel guiding blacks toward any contrivance that might mimic the South's vanished era.
Id. at 17-24.
158. 1883 Ark. Acts 20, §§ 7-9.
159. Id. 78, § 5 (emphasis added).
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convict may be held to labor in discharge of the [fine and costs]."'16
For his part, the contractor was required to file a monthly statement of
the time worked by the prisoner "together with all lost time" on ac-
count of weather or the contractor's fault. 16' The prisoner was not to
be charged for loss of time on this basis. Failure by the contractor to
submit the monthly statement would result in forfeiture of the con-
victs in custody. However, the contractor was under no duty to ac-
count for the inability of the convict to work and could easily make a
claim to that effect. The statement filed only had to indicate that the
fine had not yet been discharged because of the prisoner's fault. Since
the law used discretionary language for the time that might be neces-
sary, imposed no limit, and made no provision for the misdemeanant
to challenge the contractor's accounting, the system facilitated abuse.
And since prisoners served a dual function-income-generating de-
vices for court officials and long-term, inexpensive, and easily exploit-
able labor for anyone willing to pay the moneys owed-the system's
beneficiaries would be loath to protect the interests of the prisoners.
B. Controlling Opportunities for Wealth
1. The Freedmen's Bureau
Accounts of asset deprivation through involuntary abandonment,
confiscation, and theft confirm that persons of color could expect neg-
ligible assistance in ending the pattern of mistreatment existing in the
South even as constitutional amendments were ratified and Congress
legislated protection. While the Committee on Reconstruction had
established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands at war's end to assist the newly emancipated, that organization
was often powerless to prevent abuses that hampered the resettlement
of former slaves. Marshall, Texas was one area that became a
crowded haven for "[fireedmen flying for their lives ... having been
driven from their homes and forced to give up their crops.' 62 Re-
gional offices of the Bureau had already retracted promises of land
ownership to free persons when President Johnson offered amnesty to
Confederates who would return to the fold. Initial confusion as to the
effect of a presidential pardon delayed divestment of land from ex-
slaves. The Bureau was guided by its reluctance to reconvey land to
former owners in the absence of a clear directive from the executive
160. Id. § 15.
161. Id.
162. TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 106.
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branch. This was not long in coming. Using a Tennessee case, Presi-
dent Johnson "directed [Bureau Commissioner Oliver 0.] Howard to
have his assistant at Nashville restore [the former owner's] property
immediately. Furthermore, the Commissioner was instructed to take
'the same action ... in all similar cases." ' 163 This policy had a serious
regressive effect in areas where blacks had already begun to advance
their fortunes such as the Sea Islands. 164
In some places the Freedmen's Bureau itself, rather than aid in
the resettlement effort, acted complicitously to force former slaves
into labor contracts pursuant to the vagrancy provisions of the Black
Codes.165 Minnesota's representative in Congress had denounced sev-
eral provisions from the Codes that made this result possible. 166
2. Manifest Signs of Wealth
Realty was key to asset accumulation by persons of color and,
while its loss is not quantifiable with precision, facts concerning it are
more plentiful than data on personalty. Nevertheless, certain forms of
personal property were likely to be wrested from blacks. Foremost
among these were weapons that white persons associated with being
overpowered by persons of color in small combinations or as members
of local militias. Theft of animals also occurred in certain regions. In
North Carolina the Constitutional Union Guard, counting a lawyer
and deputy sheriff among its members, embarked on a campaign of
horse stealing, the animals later to be sold in other counties. 67
Areas did exist where ex-slaves could tenant farm or provide
their labor under contract for actual, perhaps liberal returns. Reduc-
tion of income occurred nonetheless at the consumption end. Blacks
in the Sea Islands, for example, earned real wages because of their
long settlements there and strong assistance from northern philan-
163. DoRsus, supra note 55, at 229.
164. See, e.g., W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Black Proletariat in South Carolina, in RECON-
STRUCTION IN Tim SouTH 62, 65 (Edwin C. Rozwenc ed., 1952).
165. See, e.g., WILsoN, supra note 40, at 59.
166. Republican Representative Donnelly cited a Virginia stipulation under which:
[any man who will not work for 'the common wages given to other laborers' shall be
deemed a vagrant; the masters have formed combinations and have put down the rate
of wages to the freedmen below a living price; the negro refusing to work for these
wages is seized as a vagrant, sold to service 'for the best wages that can be procured' for
three months; if he runs off he shall work another month with ball and chain for
nothing.
CoNo. GLOaE, supra note 3, at 589. While in Tennessee "the vagrant negro may be sold to the
highest bidder to pay his jail fees; and to make sure that he be kept a vagrant no housekeeper
shall harbor him . I... d.
167. TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 189.
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thropists as early as 1862. Even ex-slaves dissatisfied with their wages
from certain relocated northerners could rely on being paid. More-
over, their protests could and did lead to increases in pay, dispensed
with the paternalism of their employers. 168 But persons of color in
this altruistic environment often found their resources depleted at the
white-owned country stores. "Prices paid by blacks varied 'from 20 to
100 percent above the market value of the goods, according to the
amount of competition among the storekeepers."' 1 69
The circumstances surrounding tenant farming often made it a
perilous occupation. Incorporated in its issues of safety and enjoy-
ment of possessions was the fact of debt peonage. 170 Although origi-
nally perpetuated by vagrancy laws, debt peonage was incidental but
routine in the context of sharecropping or tenant farming.171 In exam-
ining the phenomenon of sharecropping in Georgia and elsewhere in
the South, one economist outlined its expansion beginning in the "late
1860s, [although] it took some years thereafter for it to become the
dominant organizational basis for plantation agriculture in the
South.' 72 Advancement of seed and other necessaries by the land-
owner in exchange for repayment when the tenant's crop was har-
vested and sold almost never allowed for satisfaction of the debt.
168. A notable example was the black laborers of Edward Philbrick, son of a famed Boston
abolitionist, who defended his payment of less than he would have paid for northern labor on the
ground that "a rapid rise in wages would enable the Negroes to secure [household and personal]
goods with a minimum of effort, thus defeating the purpose [of stimulating industry among black
workers]." WILLIE LEE ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION: THE PORT ROYAL EXPERI-
MENT 301 (1964); see also Sarah W. Foster & John T. Foster, Jr., Chloe Merrick Reed: Freedom's
First Lady, 71 FLA. HIsT. Q. 279, 283-84 (1993) (Northern teachers were recruited by Freed-
men's Relief Associations to assist in the relocation and education of ex-slaves in the Sea Islands
following conquest of the area in 1862.).
169. HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925, at
626 n.5 (1976).
170. The Black Codes introduced this practice through their vagrancy provisions directed at
former slaves despite general language. Mississippi was typical in authorizing the arrest of those,
on the ground of vagrancy, who had not signed labor contracts by January 1, 1866. "[I]f con-
victed and unable to pay the fine of $50.00, [they] were to be hired out to the person who would
pay the fine and require the shortest period of labor in return." FRANKLIN, supra note 76, at 49;
see also WILSON, supra note 40, at 101 (describing Virginia's law of 1865-1866 under which "[t]he
convicted vagrant might be put to work by the town or county or hired out for any term not
exceeding three months").
171. These terms are often used synonymously although there are differences. See Appling
v. Odom, 46 Ga. 583, 584-85 (1872).
There is an obvious distinction between a cropper and a tenant. One has a possession
of the premises, exclusive of the landlord; the other has not. The one has a right for a
fixed time; the other has only a right to go on the land to plant, work and gather the
crop. The possession of the land is with the owner as against the cropper. This is not so
of the tenant.
Id
172. See MANDLE, supra note 7, at 19.
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Advances made periodically carried higher repayment rates that
would allow the landowner to appropriate the tenant's portion. Obli-
gated to the landowner from year to year, the tenant had little chance
of extinguishing his debt and acquiring assets from his share of the
crop. Unless the landowner could effectively bind the tenant to him
from season to season, however, this would not qualify as peonage.
One of two events occurred, either one of which guaranteed a state of
poverty for the tenant; and one of them approximated a strict defini-
tion of peonage. Encompassing the period immediately after emanci-
pation and beyond, writers have noted that landowners, often with the
aid of local law enforcement, coerced the tenant to remain; 173 or the
tenants disappeared. 174 If debt could be avoided, planters' cartels
contrived to limit payment to tenants under the terms of their con-
tracts. 175 In the last decade of the nineteenth century the practice of
"whitecapping" attempted to block "the unsupervised rental of land
to blacks and hoped to frighten the black tenants into accepting em-
ployment on the plantations of resident landlords. To accomplish
their ends . . . [secret organizations of farmers] issued warnings,
burned homes, beat blacks, and fired shots into houses."'1 76 Whitecap-
ping caused blacks to flee from some areas of the South1 77
Finally, in the strictest sense, peonage occurred through kidnap-
pings and imprisonment on plantations to ease labor shortages. The
violence in Alabama in late 1870 and 1871 left areas without workers
and exposed persons of color in nearby Mississippi to peril by "white
gangs who crossed the state line to kidnap them.' 78
The difficulty in evaluating the degree of deprivation that persons
of color experienced as a result of violence is compounded by conflict-
ing interpretations. Even an assessment cast in the most favorable
light, however, leads to the conclusion that, in the last third of the
nineteenth century, most southern blacks remained poor. Two areas
of inquiry for any such evaluation are land and utilizable skills. One
economic historian has stated that "[i]n every Southern state success-
173. Id. at 20. Acknowledging the omission of another observer to explicitly quantify such
peonage, Mandle nonetheless accepts the other's account-representing the years of sharecrop-
ping's growth: "[B]y 1901 southern society had reached the point where a debt-labor system
characterized by violence and the corruption or acquiescence of local police officers was openly
tolerated." Id.
174. See HIGGS, supra note 11, at 59 (in the context of escaping debt to the landowner,
"Once again the black man's mobility. .. was his ultimate reliance in resisting oppression").
175. Id. at 47.
176. Id. at 76.
177. Id.
178. TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 290.
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ful tenants used the proceeds of a particularly good year to purchase
farms."'1 79 Land ownership, then, can operate as both a reliable indi-
cator of proceeds sufficient to buy land and access to land. As of 1876,
the Department of Agriculture ascertained that black land ownership
in the South (excluding Virginia and Kentucky but including Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Car-
olina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas) was eight percent or less
and usually five percent or less.'80 Those persons of color who owned
land often attained a level of prosperity comparable to that of whites
during slavery. Among Sea Islanders, whose freedom preceded that
of mainland southern blacks, "a number of freedmen had bought at
the auctions the town houses of the late white residents [of
Beaufort].' 181 Collective purchase and ownership likewise occurred.
"A Port Royal Island plantation called Edgerly was bought ... in 1863
by the Negroes who lived on the land, and it was worked successfully
in common, entirely without white direction."'8' 2 In Louisiana, before
the war, free black planters-often slaveholders-"on a considerable
scale" had title to thousands of acres. 8 3
Two reasons, however, account for the negligible landowning
figures throughout the region. For the first fifteen years after emanci-
pation, limitations on land acquisition "probably resulted more from
simple poverty than from racial discrimination in the land market."'1'
Complementing that theory is the belief that "the sale of land.., was
an act of patronage" that occurred as a reward for "socially acceptable
behavior."'1 85 Under either explanation, land ownership remained
meager.
179. See HIGOS, supra note 11, at 51.
180. Id. at 51-52.
181. ROSE, supra note 168, at 314.
182. Id. at 315.
183. See, e.g., ULRICH B. PMLLIs, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 434 (1918).
184. HIGGS, supra note 11, at 52.
185. MANDLE, supra note 7, at 29; see also TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 288 (dangers
awaited whites who sold land to persons of color). No wave of farm ownership had occurred by
the century's end. The United States Census Bureau calculated that in the South-defined as
the South Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida); East South Central (Kentucky, Tennessee, Ala-
bama, and Mississippi); and West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas)-
"the percentage owned increased for Negro farm homes from 8.9 per cent in 1890 to 11.2 per
cent in 1900, the percentage of 11.1 for 1910 being practically the same as that for 1900." Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., NEGRO POPULATION 1790-1915, at 461 (1969).
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3. Practical and Professional Talents
In the case of trades or professions, appreciable numbers of
skilled blacks, who could acquire assets based on those skills, did not
materialize until the turn of the century. These numbers depended in
part on the region's trade laws; rarely were such persons to be found
in rural settings where most blacks still lived.
States that regulated many aspects of commerce could place sub-
tle obstacles in the paths of blacks who attempted simple trades. Even
a transaction not intended to be commercial could be regarded as
such, with adverse consequences. These regulations were especially
onerous after Reconstruction. In 1884, Virginia's laws illustrated the
means by which a person of color, as the most available target, could
be the unsuspecting quarry in a maze of rules. Its license laws were
exhaustive, listing endeavors generally within mercantile, entertain-
ment, and professional categories. Among the least skilled activities
regulated was peddling, which required a minimum fee of fifty dollars
for a license to travel on foot, with more expensive licenses corre-
sponding to the mode of transit and area of operation. 186 Virginia
defined a peddler as "Any person who shall carry from place to place
any goods, wares, or merchandise, and offer to sell or barter the same,
or actually sell or barter the same, in transitu or otherwise .... ,187 A
single instance of sale or exchange of any item for money, goods, or
service without possession of a license would, if discovered, cost be-
tween one hundred and five hundred dollars as a fine. And to ensure
compliance (at the same time inviting entrapment), the Common-
wealth ordered that "one-half of [the fine] shall go to the
informer .... 188
As they had done during the Black Code years, some southern
states later scrupulously refrained from specifying persons of color as
the targets of laws enacted to control certain commercial activities. 189
But a comparison of statistics compiled by the Census Bureau gives
one perspective on the accessibility of trades to blacks. In 1850, in
Louisiana (the only southern state the Bureau categorized under oc-
cupations) there were 325 masons among a population of 2,809 free
186. 1884 Va. Acts § 33.
187. Id. at § 32.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 40, at 108. In 1866, "[t]he North Carolina vagrancy law
was so written that no discrimination appears, yet it in fact opened the way to as much discrimi-
nation [against persons of color] as any county court judge cared to exercise." Id.
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males of color fifteen years of age and older. 190 Likewise, there were
86 tailors.19' In 1910, the next year for which the Census Bureau com-
piled such figures, Louisiana had only 834 masons out of a total black
male population of 259,937 ten years of age and older.' 92 There were
281 tailors among this population in that same year.193 Over a period
of sixty years, then, no real increase in these traditional occupations
occurred; proportionally, the figures represent a loss.194
In fact it was not until after 1890 that a southern black bourgeoi-
sie of any appreciable size connected to entrepreneurial and profes-
sional undertakings began to emerge. One professional group that
has been charted is black lawyers. 95 Although individual instances of
admissions of persons of color to southern state bars occurred in the
late 1860s, inroads for this group in the South began mainly in the
1870s, during Reconstruction. South Carolina is a case in point.
When the University of South Carolina integrated its student body in
1873, withdrawal of white students opposed to this course "made the
university 'predominantly black' until 1877."196 The result was the
graduation of "several blacks from its law school" during this pe-
riod.197 With the end of Reconstruction "the prospects for law as a
profession for blacks [in South Carolina] faded for nearly a quarter of
a century,"198 and the numbers of black lawyers in general remained
exceedingly small.1 9
190. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 185, at 511.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 518.
193. Id.
194. In 1850, black masons represented 11.6 % of free blacks as a whole (325 masons divided
by 2,809); and tailors made up 3 % (86 tailors divided by 2,809). Id. at 511. If slave artisans were
counted and the population adjusted to include both slaves and free people, the percentages
might increase or decrease depending on whether the number of slave artisans to slave popula-
tion was high or low. Percentages for 1910 reveal that neither masons nor tailors were artisans
of any numerical consequence. In the former case, they were .3 % of the free male population
(834 divided by 259,937); in the latter case, they were .1 % of the free male population (281
divided by 259,937). Id. at 518. Census records indicate the percentage of persons of color
between five and fourteen in Louisiana for the year 1910. Excluding that group (a larger seg-
ment than necessary since the 1910 artisan figures were based on a population ten years old and
above) to loosely resemble the age group for the 1850 figures but keeping the 1910 artisan
figures unchanged results in virtually no increase in those minuscule percentages. A rise in the
numbers, then-from 325 to 834, and 86 to 281--does not correspond to a proportionate gain in
skilled workers sixty years later. See id. at 179 (for a breakdown of age groupings in 1910
Louisiana).
195. See generally J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAW-
YER 1844-1944 (1993).
196. Id. at 219.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 223.
199. The Census Bureau recorded a figure of 798 black lawyers, judges, and justices through-
out the country as a whole in 1910, representing a ratio of 12,315 persons of color to every black
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Mainly, "the process [of an emerging black bourgeoisie] occurred
at different rates and times in different cities, most markedly in those
communities where the largest in-migration and residential segrega-
tion were taking place. ' '200 Clearly this phenomenon did not have a
significant influence on the masses of ex-slaves throughout the rural
South.
C. Reconstruction's Demise and the Revival
of White Authoritarianism
What then was the mitigating effect of Reconstruction on per-
sonal safety and wealth acquisition among persons of African de-
scent? Did the influx of black legislators to statehouses and Congress
deliver the masses from the abuses of slavery's residual effects?
Although "politically aggressive" enough to demand and get a pres-
ence in these bodies commensurate with their numbers, that aggres-
siveness "did not extend to other phases of human relations."' 20' They
continued to "observe carefully the etiquette of the Southern caste
system. ' 202 Or, as another historian noted, "[W]hile [Negroes] had
influence in all of the southern radical governments ... they did not
control any of them. '20 3
Far from lasting a decade or more throughout the South as is
commonly believed, the period of Reconstruction varied from four to
ten years-1867 to 1877. In Georgia, it ended with the inauguration
of the Democratic governor, James Smith, in 1871.204 Democrats con-
trolled Virginia as early as 1870, as well as North Carolina and Ten-
nessee.20 5 Texas ousted its Republicans in 1873, Alabama and
Arkansas in 1874, and Mississippi in 1875.206 Exceptional instances of
a black political presence and pockets of activity by persons of color in
judicial or administrative affairs existed in some places until the turn
of the century, but these were uncommon in the region as a whole. 20 7
Adding to the brevity of the Reconstruction program in most south-
ern states was the undermining of policies as Reconstruction un-
lawyer. The comparable ratio for whites was 718 persons to each white lawyer. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, supra note 185, at 510.
200. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 5, at 199.
201. Francis B. Simkins, New Viewpoints of Southern Reconstruction, in RECONSTRUCnON IN
THE SOUTH 84, 86 (Edwin C. Rozwenc ed., 1952).
202. Id.
203. STAMPP, supra note 90, at 167.
204. FRANKLIN, supra note 76, at 196.
205. Id. at 197.
206. Id.
207. See infra note 209.
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folded. Opposition was not merely external. White Republicans
often disagreed with their black counterparts.
Many of the native whites who held office were as opposed to the
equality of Negroes as were many of the disfranchised former Con-
federates. It was the native whites who insisted on segregated
schools and laws against intermarriage. Nor was there agreement
among the Radicals regarding the proposed social programs of the
reconstruction governments. Debates over the establishment of or-
phanages and insane asylums were often sharp and bitter, and deci-
sions to subsidize railroads and public works were reached only
after extensive wrangling among the lawmakers.208
The actions and achievements of black elected officials in the
South declined markedly with their numbers, and in many places dis-
appeared at the end of this period, not to resume until the next
century.2o9
Reducing Reconstruction's initiatives to the most outward of ap-
pearances in three fundamental categories, and contrary to "[a] truly
radical program," the balance sheet shows that land was not redis-
tributed, suffrage was not "meaningful," and skills were not re-
tained.210 The Black Codes and their successors saw to the last of
these, while straightforward opposition by the national government
stifled the echoes of previous utterances in the direction of land
redistribution. 21'
Dilution of a black political presence in legislatures and through
statewide activities took many forms. South Carolina accomplished
this directly and indirectly with tactics including:
[T]he increase of the dubious white majority in the legislature of
1877 by the expulsion of Negro members from Charleston; the ban-
ishment of Negro political leaders; a control of election machinery
so rigid that the Republicans deemed it useless to contest the elec-
tion of 1878; [and] the adoption of a gerrymandering scheme that
208. FRANKUN, supra note 76, at 195-96.
209. In South Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, and Kentucky, a black man was elected as judge
or justice during the 1880s in areas of large black populations. In Virginia, Arkansas, and Ten-
nessee from 1880 until 1888 four black men served in those state legislatures. Two black men
went to Congress from North Carolina in 1882 and 1897, one from South Carolina in 1888, and
one from Virginia in 1890. See SMrrH, supra note 195, at 203-04, 214, 220, 230, 231,277, 325, 328,
338.
210. Simkins, supra note 201, at 88.
211. See, e.g., FRANKLIN, supra note 76, at 179. "Neither Congress nor the Radical state
legislatures seriously considered measures leading to the redistribution of land. The small plant-
ing class continued to dominate that most important asset." Id Census takers contributed to
the confusion and inaccurate reports of land ownership among persons of African descent. In
Louisiana "[t]he misconception [of redistribution] arose from the fact that large landowners con-
tinued to own and control many acres which some observers, including census reporters, mistak-
enly recorded as the property of small [tenant] farmers who lived on them." Id.
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concentrated 25,000 of the state's 30,000 Negro majority in one
Congressional district .... -212
The South never rid itself of violence in the nineteenth century
and beyond even as Reconstruction died with the withdrawal of
northern pressure. Abuses assumed an unqualified racial aspect as
groups resisted the incorporation of persons of color into the fabric of
southern living. Yet the white South would not let them go. Efforts to
recruit free persons to northern cities were defeated by anti-entice-
ment laws imposing licensing fees on recruiters and obligating them to
satisfy debts of those who would migrate.213 Georgia amended its law
in 1883 to reflect its dependence on blacks for its agricultural base.
What had been understood before by "servant" to include persons of
African descent who farmed the land was made explicit in a version
that provided:
If any person, by himself or agent, shall be guilty of employing the
servant, cropper or farm laborer of another, under a written con-
tract, which shall be attested by one or more witnesses, during the
term for which he, she or they may be employed, knowing that such
servant, cropper or farm laborer was so employed; or if any person
or persons shall entice, persuade or decoy, or attempt to entice, per-
suade or decoy any servant, cropper or farm laborer, whether under
a written or parol contract, after he, she or they shall have actually
entered the service of his or her employer, to leave his employer,
either by offering higher wages, or any way whatever, during the
term of service, knowing that said servant, cropper or farm laborer
was so employed, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as prescribed .... 214
Rather than risk fines and imprisonment in southern jails, agents for
those northern industrialists willing to hire black workers abandoned
their plans.
Immigration policies also assured regional confinement of black
persons. The North did not want black workers-yet-and so sought
laborers elsewhere. "Between 1870 and 1920 immigration to the
United States averaged in excess of 500,000 per year, or almost seven
immigrants per 1,000 of the population annually. '215 While any limi-
tations on immigration conceivably meant more opportunities for
blacks in manufacturing jobs, the anti-recruitment laws of the nine-
212. FRANCIS B. SrnuNs, PITCHFORK BEN TILLMAN: SOUTH CAROLINIAN 75 n.16 (1967).
213. MANDLE, supra note 7, at 23.
214. 1883 Ga. Laws, pt. 1, tit. IV, § I.
215. MANDLE, supra note 7, at 72; see also STAMPP, supra note 90, at 19 (Liberal immigration
hastened the end of Reconstruction by fostering stereotypes among the northern middle class-
who likened the burden of their unpolished and unschooled immigrants to the burden of south-
ern blacks, and who then sympathized with southern whites.).
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teenth century helped create the barrier against an exodus north
where most such jobs were located. Consequently, openings in north-
ern industries attracted only northern black residents, and these were
disproportionately few between 1870 and 1900.216
Restricted to the South, persons of African descent faced the vio-
lence they had seen during Reconstruction made worse by openly hos-
tile state officials. There was no question that a state's chief executive
could influence and control the incidence of mob violence. Ben Tdl-
man, South Carolina's governor from 1890 to 1894, appealed for an
end to lynching in his first inaugural address "so that the finger of
scorn could no longer be pointed at South Carolina. ' 217 Although
the legislature refused to authorize him to oust sheriffs who gave no
protection to prisoners against the mobs, he conveyed his message
nonetheless. As his biographer observed:
[T]he first year of the Tillman administration was not disgraced by a
single lynching, a pleasant contrast to the twelve in one year (1889)
of the previous administration. There can be little doubt that Till-
man's vigorous attitude toward law enforcement had something to
do with the improvement.218
While never an advocate for black advancement, Tillman voiced
sentiments contrary to those in his first address at the time of his sec-
ond term, expressing his willingness to participate in lynching. His
"attitude may have been partly responsible for the sixteen lynchings
... during his second term. 219
216. The ratio of blacks in the South to blacks in the North was reported as follows: in 1870,
4,420,811 to 452,818; in 1880, 5,953,903 to 615,038; in 1890, 6,760,577 to 701,018; and in 1900,
7,922,969 to 880,771. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 185, at 33. The figures of black distri-
bution also indicate that between 1860 and 1890 the increase in black population in the North
(360,778) was far outdistanced by the growth of persons of African descent in the South for the
same period (2,663,466). Id. "[O]pportunities for blacks in the North increased only when im-
migration slowed and opportunities decreased when the inflow of migrants picked up. In short,
though immigrants and southern blacks were both potentially available for northern industrial
employment, invariably it was the immigrants who were selected for these employment opportu-
nities." See MAN tE, supra note 7, at 22
217. SIMKINs, supra note 212, at 171.
218. Id. at 174.
219. VAN DEUSEN, supra note 155, at 164; see also Simkins, supra note 201, at 85 (describing
Tillman's authority in launching an end-of-century regional campaign "to eliminate the Negro
vote").
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V. CONFRONTATION: JUDICIAL MANEUVERS CHALLENGE
RENEWED CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS
A. Enforcement Legislation of the 1870s
Optimism for relief, if not deliverance, from lawlessness and its
consequences in the South emerged with the passage of the Enforce-
ment Act of 1870220 and the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871.221 Although
the Enforcement Act was passed pursuant to the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, its scope went beyond the protection of voting rights. Section 6
stated in part,
That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in
disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another,
with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder
his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
because of his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held
guilty of felony, and, on conviction thereof shall be fined or impris-
oned, or both .... 222
As an amendment to the original version this section, despite its
general language, was intended to address mob violence in the context
of suffrage. Senator John Pool, a North Carolina Republican and the
section's sponsor, thought the original bill was incomplete. He said,
Suppose there shall be an organization of individuals, or... a single
individual, who shall take it upon himself to compel his fellow citi-
zens to vote in a particular way. Suppose he threatens to discharge
them from employment, to bring upon them the outrages which are
being perpetrated by the Kuklux organizations, so as not to prevent
their voting, but to compel them to vote in accordance with the dic-
tates of the party who brings this coercion upon them.... That is a
more threatening view of the subject than the mere preventing of
registration or of entering men's names upon the assessment books
223
Its utility for later federal trials, however, was that attacks against per-
sons of color would always have a derivative effect of threatening
would be voters-in the panoply of rights that would be foreclosed to
them, voting was one.
For the seven months following its passage, it failed to live up to
its promise. Expecting that its mere existence would render their ac-
tions unnecessary, federal officials "made almost no effort to enforce
220. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
221. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
222. § 6, 16 Stat. at 141.
223. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3612 (1870).
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the law against the Klan. '224 In Alabama a recalcitrant grand jury and
unpersuasive evidence undermined attempts to apply the Act, while in
North Carolina acceptable, if not persuasive, alibis led to similar re-
sults.225 Actions brought under the Act in Mississippi were not
concluded.226
Barely a year after passage of the Enforcement Act, Congress
enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act in response to requests for legislative
intervention by, among others, President Grant.227 South Carolina
became the testing ground for constitutional arguments under both
Acts. In response to unbridled violence there, the President had sus-
pended the writ of habeas corpus, "an act unprecedented in the U.S.
in peacetime. ' 228 This action followed the governor's failed efforts to
secure prosecution and the presidentially-endorsed arrests sabotaged
by local law enforcement.229
1. Federal Court Response in the Decade's Early Years
From a judicial standpoint, the trials begun in South Carolina had
the potential for invigorating the Fourteenth Amendment in a way
that had never been attempted. Procedurally, there was a major im-
pediment to the prosecution's goal of convincing the court that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights: "Under the
[Judiciary Act of 1869], the circuit judge held court with the federal
district judge in a particular state. '230 Judge Bond of the Fourth Cir-
cuit was a Republican while Judge Bryan, South Carolina's "first fed-
eral district judge following the Civil War, '231 was a Democrat "with
ties of kinship and friendship to many of South Carolina's most influ-
ential families. '232 Any disagreement between the judges would be
appealed to the Supreme Court, an event the defense resolved to
bring about in order that the Enforcement Act's constitutionality
224. TRELEASE, supra note 116, at 385.
225. Id. at 386.
226. Id. at 400.
227. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 120, at 236.
228. Williams, supra note 122, at 53.
229. Hall, supra note 125, at 925.
230. Id. at 933. The Judiciary Act of 1869 stated in relevant part:
The circuit courts in each circuit shall be held by the justice of the Supreme Court
allotted to the circuit, or by the circuit judge of the circuit, or by the district judge of the
district sitting alone, or by the justice of the Supreme Court and circuit judge sitting
together, in which case the justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, or in the absence
of either of them by the other, (who shall preside,) and the district judge.
Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44-45 (1869).
231. Hall, supra note 125, at 935.
232. Id.
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
could be determined at the highest level.233 Of the cases the circuit
court heard, it agreed that the Fourth Amendment had not been in-
corporated into the Fourteenth, but it disagreed on the Second
Amendment. The defense had its way although the Supreme Court
"disposed of the appeal in quick order without deciding the issues in-
volved." 234 The Enforcement Act availed the victims of outrage noth-
ing beyond a day in court. At no time did defense counsel deny the
reprehensibility of the acts committed.235 This was not a contradiction
of its role; the primary objective was to defeat an extension of federal
authority into the state. By whatever standard one might measure the
actions of lawyers or judges in these trials, the defense accomplished
its goal.
The Ku Klux Klan Act was no more successful than its predeces-
sor in extending the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most in-
dictments had been returned under the earlier legislation whose
authors' intent was never fortified by judicial affirmation.
2. The Century's Last Federal Civil Rights Legislation
In 1875 Congress passed a Supplemental Civil Rights Act.236 Sec-
tion 4 received particular judicial attention because it forbade disqual-
ification of persons of color from juries. Although collateral to the
focus of this article, the Act provides another means of determining
the states' receptivity to the Fourteenth Amendment-that constitu-
tional stimulant for equality which could release ex-slaves' freedom
from its isolation. Unlike the criticism surrounding the Ku Klux Klan
Act, which some members of Congress felt unnecessarily duplicated
the Enforcement Act, for the 1875 law Congress desired stronger con-
trol over state action-in this case state courts-and acted on its
will.
2 3 7
While Congress might speculate on the South's reactions, it could
not predict them. Each new appearance of enforcement legislation
raised the possibility that the resistance of southern state courts or
233. Id. at 934.
234. Id. at 948.
235. "Throughout the trials, [defense counsel] avoided any argument that potentially legiti-
mated the Klan's acts.... [Bloth denounced the Klan in open court." Id at 936.
236. Supplemental Civil Rights Act, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
237. The Act was passed with the prescription that courts of both "the United States, or of
any State" could not disqualify eligible citizens. This version prevailed despite a vigorous and
unsuccessful attempt to delete the language pertaining to states. See 43 CONG. REC. 1862 (1875)
(statement of Sen. Carpenter); see also CONG. GLOBE, supra note 120, at 130 (regarding what
would become the Ku Klux Klan Act, Republican Representative James Garfield of Ohio ques-
tioned, "[Wihat is wanting in the sixth section of the [Enforcement Act?]").
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federal courts (with their state partisans) or both would diminish. An
1879 case before the Supreme Court seemed to bear this out. Ex
Parte the Commonwealth of Virginia238 involved a Virginia court judge
who had excluded persons of African descent from grand and petit
juries. Following his arrest, the petitioner judge, joined by the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, challenged the jurisdiction of the district court
in writs of habeas corpus and certiorari. Upholding the constitutional-
ity of the 1875 Act, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch legislation must
act upon persons, not upon the abstract thing denominated a State,
but upon the persons who are the agents of the State in the denial of
the rights which were intended to be secured. ' 239 Here was a clear
wedge driven into a state action claim. Justice Strong, who delivered
the opinion, disposed of the petitioners' objections in sweeping
language:
Nor does it make any difference that such legislation is restrictive of
what the State might have done before the constitutional Amend-
ment was adopted. The prohibitions of the 14th Amendment are
directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of state
power. It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to
enforce against state action, however put forth, whether that action
be executive, legislative or judicial. 24°
Any prospects for change that this interpretation may have en-
couraged were short-lived. The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 eviscerated
the 1875 law by declaring Sections 1 and 2 unconstitutional. 241 Ex-
alting state action, the Supreme Court blocked what it saw as a Four-
teenth Amendment encroachment.
At least one scholar has questioned the court's motives more
than its reasoning in rendering its decision.242 The opinion's author,
Justice Bradley, had undergone a change of heart since his early think-
ing that even without additional enforcement legislation a climate of
238. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
239. Id. at 347.
240. Id. at 346.
241. 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883). Section 1 of the Act provided, in part, "That all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theaters, and other places of public amusement." Supplemental Civil Rights Act, ch. 114,
§ 1, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875). Section 2 provided, in part,
That any person who shall violate the foregoing section... shall ... forfeit and pay the
sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby ... and shall also ... be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less
than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not less
than thirty days nor more than one year..
§ 2, 18 Stat. at 336.
242. See John A. Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment
from the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERs L. REV. 552 (1971).
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"race war" justified intervention by federal authorities.243 Accepting
this perspective as the primary impulse in Justice Bradley's judicial
reasoning, must one infer that the "war of race" had found resolution
by 1883? Or that he considered the issue defunct? While his opinion
in the Civil Rights Cases gives an affirmative answer to the latter ques-
tion, events surrounding the end of Reconstruction and its aftermath
may be more revealing.
Under the national compromise reached in 1877, "[t]he South
agreed to cooperate with the election of [Rutherford B.] Hayes; [and]
the North agreed to abandon its reconstruction aims and to renounce
any further role in protecting and enforcing the rights of the freed-
man."'2 " During the critical weeks before the compromise, Congress
established the Electoral Commission to decide disputed returns. In-
cluded on the Commission were four Supreme Court Justices empow-
ered to choose a fifth. Bradley was selected, becoming the fifteenth
member of the Commission. "By a straight party vote, 8 [Republi-
cans] - 7 [Democrats], the electoral votes of [the disputed returns in
Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina] were awarded to the
Republicans," securing the presidency for Hayes "by a single [electo-
ral] vote-185 - 184."245 Questions about Bradley's integrity on this
issue246 were entwined with doubts as to his independence on the
court.247 The collaboration between Chief Justice Waite and Justice
Bradley has been examined for its possible taint of political expedi-
ency: the Chief Justice's choice of Bradley for the Commission be-
cause he would "rubber stamp the sectional compromise. ' 248 If, as
has been theorized, Chief Justice Waite engineered Bradley's selection
to the Electoral Commission with the understanding that Bradley
would act on behalf of Rutherford Hayes, consequences at the execu-
tive level were predictable-Hayes would be elected; consequences
for the Supreme Court were intimated-Bradley would acquiesce in
243. See id. at 559 ("Ordinary crimes, then, would be tried and punished in state courts, but
crimes due to 'the war of race' would be tried and punished by federal authority.").
244. Id. at 565. The "economic basis" often put forth as the impetus for the Compromise of
1877 is rooted in the federal subsidy that was to be appropriated for the building of the Texas
and Pacific Railroad and improvements to southern infrastructures. Although Congress did not
authorize the subsidy, Rutherford Hayes was elected nonetheless and proceeded to withdraw
federal troops throughout the South with a consequent rise in violence. LOGAN, supra note 51,
at 23-29.
245. Scott, supra note 242, at 565-66.
246. See id. at 566. The charge by Democrats against the Republican Bradley was vote sell-
ing: his election to the Commission and the resulting Republican victory-despite the tallying of
votes from three southern states-was too facile a coincidence. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 567.
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the compromise by retreating from his reconstruction positions.249
Regardless of impulse, the Supreme Court declined to recognize fed-
eral authority in protecting the rights of persons of color. What re-
mained was an unenforceable amendment glorifying the citizenship of
persons recently enslaved. The legislation that Congress had pro-
duced over nearly a decade could find no objective beyond its own
temporary existence. It was the legislation alone that "represented
the post-war apex in federal accounting for civil rights. '250
3. State Court Action and Federal Validation
Is it possible that by the 1880s a tolerance in southern states for
the exercise of rights by persons of color materialized which war-
ranted the voiding of enforcement legislation? All evidence refutes
this notion. Law enforcement officers, often intimidated or corrupted,
were ineffectual in protecting the rights of black persons.251 Labor,
trade, and property constraints precluded or retarded the acquisition
and enjoyment of wealth for most people of African descent. Neither
personal security nor proprietary rights matters, which may have been
litigated by blacks (but probably were not), were subjects for judicial
review. This absence of scrutiny confirms the durability of the
strained reality faced by persons of color in the South.
State judiciaries did nothing to upset the intrinsic inequality of
southern society. The few instances of deference to the spirit and let-
ter of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were exceptions.
One such anomaly is Burns v. State.252 Arising out of an Alabama
conviction for "solemnizing the rites of matrimony between a white
person and a negro, ' 253 the case cited the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found these justifiable
grounds, consistent with the state constitution, for overturning the
conviction.254 In a confident voice, the court observed:
249. See id. at 566-68. A reading of Chief Justice Waite's papers disclosed the control he
exerted over the court and his close relationship with Justice Bradley. Before selection of Brad-
ley to the Commission-an assignment "made under Waite's direction"-the Chief Justice con-
sidered a request not to appoint another Justice whose sentiments lay with Rutherford Hayes's
opponent. Id. After Hayes's inauguration "a contradiction still remained to be resolved-the
contradiction between the actuality of federal power as created by the Wartime Amendments
and pursuant legislations, and the political imperative to dismantle this threat to states' rights."
Id. at 568.
250. LIVELY, supra note 29, at 54-55.
251. See supra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
252. 48 Ala. 195 (1872).
253. Id. at 196.
254. Id. at 198-99.
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The same right to make a contract as is enjoyed by white citizens,
means the right to make any contract which a white citizen may
make. The law intended to destroy the distinctions of race and
color in respect to the rights secured by it. It did not aim to create
merely an equality of the races in reference to each other. If so,
laws prohibiting the races from suing each other, giving evidence for
or against, or dealing with one another, would be permissible. The
very excess to which such a construction would lead is conclusive
against it.255
In December of 1877, with the end of Reconstruction, the Ala-
bama Supreme Court expressly overruled Burns in Green v. State.256
Berating the earlier court for its misinterpretation of a state statute
that, so the later argument went, did preserve equality, the Green
court said:
What the law declares to be a punishable offense, is, marriage be-
tween a white person and a negro. And it no more tolerates it in
one of the parties than the other-in a white person than in a negro
or mulatto; and each of them is punishable for the offense prohib-
ited, in precisely the same manner and to the same extent.257
As for the "so-called 'civil rights act,"' the court noted that the north-
ern representatives who voted for it came from states with laws similar
to that under review. The Act's failure to mention intermarriage led
to the "presumption" that it did not accord greater rights to persons of
color in the North than they already had.258
This was a shrewder move than Kentucky's highest court had
made in Bowlin,259 an outright protest against Fourteenth Amend-
ment incursion. The Green court feigned compliance with a constitu-
tional directive by a pretextual conformity with Congress' electorate.
In the same year that the Supreme Court decided the Civil Rights
Cases, it reviewed another Alabama case on a related topic: the con-
stitutionality of an Alabama statute penalizing adultery between a
white person and a person of color. 26° The Court upheld the penalty
with an argument that mirrored the language in Green. Alabama's
statute did not discriminate against either race because the same pun-
ishment was to be applied to both parties. A different level of punish-
ment conditioned on whether the parties were of the same race or not
255. Id. at 197.
256. 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
257. Id. at 192.
258. Id. at 192-93.
259. See Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5 (1867).
260. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 584 (1883).
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was "directed against the offense designated and not against the per-
son of any particular color or race."261
What little state appellate courts had done-albeit during Recon-
struction-to broaden the range of rights for persons of color, the
Supreme Court lent its might to remove that margin.
B. Intimations of Redress for Mob Violence
In the opening decade of the next century, the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Alabama declined to construe the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as authorizing a federal prohibition against individual
lawlessness. 262 While this act is unremarkable, the circuit court in
United States v. Powell, a 1907 opinion, developed a singular line of
reasoning that carved the beginnings of a ledge on which a fullblown
state action by state inaction argument might someday stand. The de-
fendant had been indicted for conspiracy "to injure, threaten, oppress,
and intimidate" Horace Maples, a person of color, who had been ar-
rested on a murder charge.263 The defendant was part of a lynch mob
that took Maples from the Huntsville sheriff's custody and hanged
him in the courthouse yard.26 Among other things, the defendant ar-
gued that the indictment did not show a "violat[ion of] any right, privi-
lege, or immunity secured to Maples, under the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or that any federal law had been violated. '265
There were two components to the court's framing of the issue:
[W]hether a citizen lawfully held in the custody of the state, await-
ing trial on a charge of crime, has any right or immunity, which Con-
gress can protect under the fourteenth amendment, against lawless
violence of private individuals, which prevents, and is designed to
prevent, the state from affording the accused, when it endeavors to do
so, the benefit of a trial according to the 'law of the land,' by the
administration of the state's established course of judicial
procedure.266
Distinguishing between negative and positive duties of the state,
the court disposed straightforwardly of the first kind in the context of
261. Id. at 585. But see Ex Parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879) ("Such
legislation must act upon persons, not upon the abstract thing denominated a
State .. "). During the 1880s, some northern states, notably Pennsylvania, made judicial and
legislative pronouncements against discrimination although within the narrow scope of public
accommodations. See David McBride, Mid-Atlantic State Courts and the Struggle with the "Sepa-
rate but Equal" Doctrine: 1880-1939, 17 RUTGERS LJ. 569 (1986).
262. United States v. Powell, 151 F. 648 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907), affd, 212 U.S. 564 (1909).
263. Id. at 649.
264. id.
265. Id. at 650.
266. Id. (emphasis added).
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equal protection. A negative duty required a state "not to do wrong,
not to grant rights and privileges to one person, while denying them
under the same circumstances to others. ' 267 When a state is under
this duty, a citizen has equal protection of laws and "it is impossible
for private individuals to impair, in the constitutional sense, the enjoy-
ment of the right" to such protection.268 Under this view, any act of
terror or outrage, so long as it has no connection to the state or its
agents, could not amount to a violation of rights secured under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This had been, and would continue to be,
the conventional approach to violence by private individuals or com-
binations of private individuals. But the Powell court added a feature
that would link private individuals to the state. Corresponding to the
second element of the issue, a positive duty on the state required it to
"afford the prisoner the due administration of its 'established course
of judicial procedure.' ' 269 Once the state had initiated its criminal jus-
tice procedures by taking an accused into custody, "[i]t must safely
keep and protect him in prison, until it can give him the opportunity,
as well as the right, to appear before its tribunal. ' 270 Presuming that
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were fully aware of mob
violence and the taking of black prisoners, the court extended this
premise: "[W]hat just foundation is there for holding that [the amend-
ment's] framers intended that the attempt and failure of the state to
fully perform these duties.., should deprive Congress of all power to
deal with private individuals, who designedly cause such failure?" 271
The court found no conflict between its position and that of the
Supreme Court in either the Slaughter-House Cases or the Civil Rights
Cases. Far from "degrad[ing] state governments by subjecting them to
the control of Congress," 272 it would recognize the power of Congress
in a way not amounting to "'affirmative' enforcement of the right,
since it is not usurpation or invasion of state power or state law. '273
The federal legislation under which the indictment was brought did
not violate the Constitution.
The court's analysis, however, was dictum. Hodges v. United
States274 had been submitted to the Supreme Court during the same
267. Id. at 653.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 654.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 656.
272. Id. at 657.
273. Id. at 658.
274. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
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term as Riggins v. United States,275 which was the appeal of Powell's
co-defendant. Both cases were decided before Powell. The Riggins
trial, from which Powell had obtained a severance, upheld counts of
an indictment charging Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tions.276 On appeal, the Supreme Court in Riggins quashed a writ of
habeas corpus on a procedural ground, without examining any consti-
tutional issue. That Court's actions in Hodges were more significant.
The primary issue in Hodges was whether a mob that had threatened
several persons of African descent in their employment had violated
their Thirteenth Amendment rights; secondarily, it considered if the
indictment, founded on legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, was sustainable.2 77 The Court held that since no viola-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment had occurred, the protection of
citizens rested solely with the state. On that basis, the federal courts
"had no jurisdiction of the wrong charged in the indictment. ' 278 The
Court did not address constitutional issues beyond the Thirteenth
Amendment question.
The circuit court in Powell might, therefore, have applied its anal-
ysis to the outcome in view of the Supreme Court's failure to illumi-
nate its Fourteenth Amendment reasoning in Hodges beyond a citing
of the Tenth Amendment and the Slaughter-House Cases. Acknowl-
edging that no precedent barred its interpretation, the court in Powell
observed, "After a very careful search of the decisions of the Supreme
Court, not one can be found in which the precise question here was
involved .... ,,279 Instead, however, the court deferred, stating:
While there may be doubt as to what it intended [in Hodges], the
Supreme Court is the only court which can properly solve that
doubt. If this court solves its own doubts as to the meaning of the
Supreme Court against the defendant, and puts him to trial, and it
turns out that this court is mistaken, it will inflict needless hardship
upon the defendant, and put the government to much useless
expense.280
On the authority of Hodges, the court held:
that no right, privilege, or immunity in respect of due process, at any
stage in the duty of affording it, arises under the fourteenth amend-
ment, unless there be denial of the right by the state or its officers,
275. 199 U.S. 547 (1905).
276. Ex Parte Riggins, 134 F. 404 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904), rev'd, 199 U.S. 547 (1905).
277. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 15.
278. Id. at 20.
279. United States v. Powell, 151 F. 648, 651 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907), affd, 212 U.S. 564
(1909).
280. Id. at 663.
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and that no immunity whatever is secured under the Constitution or
laws, in a case,. . . against lawlessness of private individuals which
frustrates the states's efforts to perform its constitutional duty,
although thereby all enjoyment of the benefits of due process be
prevented. 281
Powell was affirmed without opinion on appeal to the Supreme
Court.282 The same year as the high court's affirmation of Powell, it
rendered a decision suggestive of the spirit of the Alabama Circuit
Court's reasoning when it demonstrated a willingness to hold account-
able state agents who would passively condone a lynching.283
No court of this era would definitively confront the problem of
individual or mob violence against persons of African descent, former
slaves and free, assaulted outside the bounds of an official structure.
The organized terror of the late 1860s and 1870s, which was abetted
by complicit sheriffs and deputies, and evasive judicial machinery, left
an area rife with bigotry in all its manifestations.
CONCLUSION
Can facts and events serve as an inverse telescope giving one ex-
planation for and one perspective on the sometimes nonexistent, al-
ways unsure foothold persons of African descent attempted in the
living of their lives and the enjoyment of their possessions following
the Civil War? Can one conclude that a climate of oversight and am-
biguity, of reluctance or ineptitude in restraining abusive conduct,
demonstrates the failure of a collective, regional, ultimately national
intent to proceed toward a meaningful, if not a more perfect, union?
The Civil War generated a patchwork of entities and policies purport-
ing to establish rights for the newly freed, as well as to solidify or
confirm the rights of previously free persons of color. But the hostility
of a mostly vengeful white South, and the frailty of reconstructed gov-
erning bodies put the lie to any genuine promises of opportunity,
much less equality.
State courts defied and circumvented executive and constitutional
decrees; legislatures enacted measures or applied existing rules to
dominate the least privileged racial category; enforcement officers col-
luded with or shrank from the most privileged racial segment in its
perpetuation of violence; federal courts rejected the incremental ef-
forts of constitutionally-inspired legislation to recognize indistinct yet
281. Id. at 664.
282. 212 U.S. 564 (1909).
283. See United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909).
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comprehensible civil rights. While the North, with its innumerable
contradictions, was never irreproachable in its treatment of blacks
during that epoch, it had taken a stand in the matter of slavery 284 and
had permitted an intensity of dialogue in a way the South would not
have tolerated.
The Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments were like a freshly-kilned receptacle symbolizing
freedom. Removed from its base and tested for soundness, it broke
apart and remained so for generations until courts, legislatures, and,
more fundamentally, attitudes began to apply the glue that has reas-
sembled it to its current state-fault lines still perceptible.
284. See, e.g., Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860) (upholding a statute declaring free any
slave introduced into the state while in transit with the consent of that person's owner); an
appeal of Lemmon to the Supreme Court might have had disastrous results for the North. The
Civil War's intervention prevented the high court from reprising its Dred Scott holding or a
variation with the consequence of "some form of slavery in the North." PAUL FINKELMAN, AN
IMPERFECr UNION: SLAvERY, FEDERALISM, AND CoMrry 322-23 (1981).

